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 The overall objective of this dissertation is to investigate the interface between both firm- 
and country-level corporate governance mechanisms and fair value accounting for a sample of 
international financial institutions in the post-financial crisis period. In order to meet this 
objective, I conduct two studies investigating different aspects of the fair value hierarchy and the 
role of corporate governance. 
 The first study investigates the impact of firm- and country-level corporate governance 
mechanisms on the relevance and reliability of the estimates provided by the fair value hierarchy. 
This is examined for a sample of publicly listed banks from Canada and the European Union and 
extends the scant literature on the interface between corporate governance and fair value 
accounting. The results show that, contrary to prior research, investors do not consider level 3 
fair value estimates to be reliable enough to be incorporated into firm value and thus, are not 
value relevant. Further testing, however, reveals that corporate governance mechanisms act in 
such a manner as to increase the perceived reliability of level 3 fair value estimates such that 
investors do consider them to be value relevant. Moreover, the results suggest that, in the context 
of value relevance decisions, firm- and country-level governance mechanisms act as substitutes 
for one another. 
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 The second study investigates the potential for the fair value hierarchy to act as an 
alternative vehicle for earnings management in banks, and the role that firm- and country-level 
corporate governance plays in impacting the relationship between two competing earnings 
management methods. Extant earnings management literature on financial institutions focuses on 
the use of the loan loss provision to manage earnings. However, the recent change in accounting 
standards towards fair value accounting has provided an alternative vehicle for earnings 
management, specifically through level 2 and level 3 fair value measurements. The results show 
that level 2 fair values do not appear to be a viable tool to manage earnings. However, after 
accounting for the effect of either firm- or country-level corporate governance, the results 
suggest that level 3 fair values can act as an alternative earnings management tool. Managers 
faced with high (low) governance report lower (higher) levels of discretionary loan loss 
provisions as the proportion of level 3 assets increases. Moreover, additional analyses provide 
preliminary results suggesting that, in the context of earnings management, firm- and country-
level governance mechanisms act as complements for one another.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 While not a new concept, the use of fair value accounting for financial reporting purposes 
by global financial institutions continues to raise several concerns (Ford & Marriage, 2018). The 
increasing reach of fair value accounting reflects actions from both the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) in the United States and the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), starting with SFAS 107 and 119 about fair value disclosure and continuing with several 
other standards. More recently, via Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 820 (formerly 
SFAS 157 and 159) for the FASB, and International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 13 for 
the IASB, both standard setters have put forward formal definitions of fair value and outlined a 
framework for measuring and reporting fair values. The increased usage of fair value accounting 
has created a lot of controversy that has permeated through both the academic and corporate 
worlds. At the heart of this controversy is the trade-off between relevance and reliability. That is, 
fair value accounting is generally viewed as being more timely and relevant compared to 
historical cost accounting, however the fair value information provided by firms might also be 
subject to managerial input and potential bias, which can have detrimental effects on the 
perceived reliability of the information. Some have gone so far as to proclaim that fair value 
accounting is inevitable and that there is simply no better alternative currently available (Barth, 
2007). On the other hand, there have been strong outspoken opponents of fair value, citing its 
lack of perceived reliability and its vulnerability to significant managerial influence (Benston, 
2008; Penman, 2007; Watts, 2003). Much of the negative reaction towards fair value accounting 
appears to have been the result of speculation as to the role that it may have played in the global 
financial crisis. Some contend that fair value accounting introduced artificial volatility to the 
financial statements which was not reflective of the actual underlying economic situation 
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(Benston, 2008; Laux & Leuz, 2009; Magnan, 2009). Contrary to this viewpoint, others suggest 
that fair value accounting merely acted as a messenger by showing the actual underlying 
economic instability on the financial statements that was able to remain hidden by historical cost 
accounting (André, Cazavan-Jeny, Dick, Richard, & Walton, 2009; Badertscher, Burks, & 
Easton, 2012; Véron, 2008).  
While the truth of the matter is likely somewhere in between these two extremes, a 
resolution to this debate is beyond the scope of this paper. However, regardless of which side of 
the debate you are on, it appears as though fair value accounting is here to stay. As such, it is 
necessary to investigate the reliability of fair value accounting, and ways that it can be improved, 
while retaining the benefits of its increased relevance over historical cost accounting. The focus 
of this dissertation is to investigate the relevance and reliability concerns surrounding the use of 
fair value accounting by using a sample of international financial institutions. Given that much of 
the primary concerns about the use of fair value accounting centre around its perceived 
unreliability, largely due to the potential for managerial manipulation, this dissertation also 
examines the interface between fair value accounting and corporate governance mechanisms.  
This dissertation conducts two separate studies to investigate different aspects of the 
relationship between fair value accounting and corporate governance for which there is currently 
limited evidence. More specifically, the third chapter of this dissertation investigates the effect of 
corporate governance on the value relevance of the fair value hierarchy and attempts to answer 
the following research questions: 1) How do firm-level and country-level corporate governance 
mechanisms individually affect the relevance and reliability of fair value accounting 
information? and 2) How do firm-level and country-level corporate governance mechanisms 
jointly affect the relevance and reliability of fair value accounting information? The fourth 
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chapter of this dissertation investigates the potential role that the fair value hierarchy plays in the 
earnings management behaviour of banks and attempts to answer the following research 
questions: 1) Is fair value accounting used as an alternate vehicle for earnings management? and 
2) How do firm-level and country-level corporate governance mechanisms influence this 
relationship? 
In order to answer the first set of research questions, I use a modified Ohlson (1995) 
model to test the association between the different levels of the fair value hierarchy and the share 
price four months after the fiscal year end. This relationship is investigated for an international 
sample of banks during the period following the global financial crisis. Specifically, the sample 
period covers 2011 – 2017 and includes banks from Canada and 28 additional countries across 
Europe. The results of this model are used to determine whether investors find the information 
provided by the fair value hierarchy to be reliable enough to be incorporated into the value of a 
firm. I then incorporate, first individually and then jointly, the effect of firm- and country-level 
governance to determine the effect these governance mechanisms have on the value relevance of 
the fair value hierarchy. The results from this study suggest that, contrary to prior research, 
investors do not find level 3 fair values to be reliable enough to include in share prices. However, 
after the inclusion of either firm- or country-level governance, all levels of the fair value 
hierarchy are value relevant. Further tests reveal that while there is a significant result for the 
joint effect of firm- and country-level governance, in the context of value relevance, these two 
forms of governance act as substitutes for one another. 
In order to answer the second set of research questions, I investigate the effect that the 
fair value hierarchy has on the most commonly used measure of earnings management in banks, 
the discretionary component of the loan loss provision. This relationship is investigated for a 
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sample of international banks from Canada and 29 additional countries from Europe for the 
period 2011 – 2017. Initial results suggest that the levels of the fair value hierarchy that are 
subject to managerial discretion do not have a significant effect on the discretionary loan loss 
provisions. However, after taking either firm- or country-level governance into account, the 
results suggest that there is a strong relationship between level 3 fair values and the discretionary 
loan loss provision. Moreover, the results indicate that this relationship is dependent on the level 
of governance, such that strong (weak) governance results in higher proportions of level 3 fair 
values being negatively (positively) associated with discretionary loan loss provisions. Finally, 
an additional analysis investigating the joint effect of firm- and country-level governance 
suggests that, in the context of earnings management, these two forms of governance act as 
complements to one another. 
 This dissertation builds upon and extends the literature on banks, fair value accounting, 
and corporate governance in four significant ways. First, due to the complex nature of financial 
institutions, banks are typically excluded from the accounting literature. However, by their very 
nature, banks are the institutions that are most affected by the accounting standards related to fair 
value accounting, thus making them the ideal industry in which to investigate topics related to 
fair value accounting. Second, the third chapter of this dissertation contributes to the fair value 
accounting literature by shedding additional insights into the relevance and reliability trade-off 
by utilizing an international sample of banks. The literature has, to this point, typically focused 
on country-specific samples, commonly the United States (Goh, Li, Ng, & Yong, 2015; Liao, 
Kang, Morris, & Tang, 2013; Song, Thomas, & Yi, 2010). This dissertation takes advantage of 
the fact that a large number of countries have adopted IFRS. Despite some minor differences in 
the application of IFRS in general, a common set of reporting standards allows for an 
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international comparison that was not possible under different accounting regimes. Third, despite 
robust individual literatures on fair value accounting, earnings management, and corporate 
governance, there is a significant gap when it comes to jointly investigating these topics. There is 
limited research investigating the fair value hierarchy as an alternative means to manage earnings 
and, to the best of my knowledge, none that consider the effect of corporate governance on the 
relationship between two competing forms of earnings management. The fourth chapter of this 
dissertation is, to the best of my knowledge, the first study to address this gap in the literature 
and to investigate the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between 
alternative vehicles for earnings management in banks. Finally, this study adds to the corporate 
governance literature by responding to the call to investigate country-level and firm-level 
corporate governance mechanisms simultaneously when investigating an international sample of 
firms. This study is among the first to simultaneously investigate the interface between both 
firm-level and country-level corporate governance mechanisms and fair value accounting for an 
international sample of banks. Moreover, while the global financial crisis certainly represented 
an important period in which to study fair value accounting, periods of financial crises represent 
relative outliers in terms of economic times. Thus, investigating and judging fair value 
accounting only in terms of the recent global financial crisis is short sighted and potentially 
misleading. Only through investigating fair value accounting during typical economic times, in 
addition to periods of crisis, can the full picture of the relevance and reliability of fair value 
accounting truly begin to emerge. 
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 contains a brief review 
of the fair value accounting literature and is relevant to both studies contained within this 
dissertation. Chapter 3 develops hypotheses, presents methodologies, and discusses the results of 
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the study investigating the impact of firm- and country-level corporate governance mechanisms 
on the value relevance of the fair value hierarchy. Chapter 4 develops hypotheses, presents 
methodologies, and discusses the results of the study investigating the potential for the fair value 
hierarchy to be used as an alternative vehicle for earnings management, and the impact of firm- 
and country-level corporate governance on this usage. Finally, Chapter 5 presents the conclusion 




Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
2.1 Fair Value Accounting 
Fair value accounting (FVA), as defined by both the ASC 820 and IFRS 13, is “the price 
that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction 
between market participants at the measurement date” (IFRS Foundation, 2011). In attempts to 
improve the consistency and comparability of fair value information, a fair value hierarchy 
consisting of three different levels has been established. The placement of a particular financial 
statement item in a given level is determined by the inputs used in valuing the underlying asset 
or liability, with the instrument being fully classified into the level of the lowest level input that 
is significant to the valuation process (IFRS 13:76). In order to be classified as level 1, the 
valuation inputs need to be quoted prices in active markets for identical assets or liabilities. Items 
valued using level 1 inputs are considered to be the most reliable as management is not permitted 
to adjust the fair value, except in limited situations (IFRS 13:77). Moving down the fair value 
hierarchy, level 2 assets and liabilities are valued based on inputs other than quoted market  
prices, but that are observable for an asset or liability (IFRS 13:81). Oftentimes level 2 inputs 
will take the form of quoted prices for similar instruments in active markets or quoted prices for 
similar or identical assets in inactive markets. Level 2 inputs are often considered to be less 
reliable than level 1 inputs as there is an element of management discretion in determining the 
appropriate comparison or inputs to use (Kolev, 2019; Song et al., 2010). Finally, level 3 inputs 
are unobservable (IFRS 13:86). The fair values that are a product of level 3 inputs are generally 
considered to be the least reliable as they are based on model inputs and the models are 
determined by management and are often not disclosed to external users. Level 3 fair values are 
commonly referred to as mark-to-model values, but some have taken to referring to them as 
8 
 
mark-to-myth, which is an indication of how these values might be viewed by members external 
to the company (Buffett, 2003; Kolev, 2019; Magnan, Menini, & Parbonetti, 2015). 
 The timing of the implementation of SFAS 157 and IFRS 13 and the ensuing global 
financial crisis led to the inevitable linkage, and assumed causal link, between the two events. 
This created a significant debate in the academic literature about the role that fair value 
accounting may or may not have played in the global financial crisis (Laeven & Levine, 2009). 
Critics of fair value accounting argued that it was not only a significant contributing factor to the 
financial crisis itself, but that it also further exacerbated the severity of the crisis (Bhat & Ryan, 
2015; de Jager, 2014; Georgiou, 2018; McDonough & Shakespeare, 2015). Proponents of fair 
value accounting, on the other hand, suggest that it merely delivered the news of the underlying 
instability that was hidden under historical cost accounting (Linsmeier, 2011; Magnan, 2009). 
The role that fair value accounting ultimately played in the financial crisis is likely to fall 
somewhere between these two extreme and opposing viewpoints (Badertscher et al., 2012; Laux 
& Leuz, 2009; Véron, 2008). What is important to recognize is that calls for the complete return 
to historical cost accounting are premature and that further changes to the accounting system 
may not be the most appropriate way to deal with these issues (Laux & Leuz, 2009). Much of the 
recent research that has been performed on fair value accounting has centered on samples around 
the period of the global financial crisis. This was largely out of necessity due to data availability 
as a result of the close proximity of the crisis to the implementation of expanded disclosures 
surrounding fair value. Now that the global financial crisis has passed, it is important to further 
investigate fair value accounting, especially its relevance and reliability in a post-crisis period. 
Investigating the post-crisis period is essential to gain a better understanding of the behaviour of 
fair value accounting in periods of economic normalcy. Combined with research performed on 
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fair value accounting surrounding the global financial crisis, this body of research will provide 
for a better understanding of the benefits and drawbacks of the standards as they currently are. 
 The debate on the relevance and reliability of fair value accounting, and its potential role 
in the global financial crisis, has been the foundation on which much of the recent fair value 
accounting literature has been built. Using this foundation as a starting point, I identified two 
specific areas for which there are still significant gaps in our knowledge. Specifically, there are 
gaps in the literature surrounding the value relevance of fair value accounting and in the 
literature on its potential to be used as an alternative form of earnings management. These gaps 
are particularly prevalent for international samples and for the post-global financial crisis period. 
Moreover, within the limited literature that is available on these topics, the important role of 
firm- and/or country-level governance is often omitted. This dissertation builds upon this 




Chapter 3 – Value Relevance of the Fair Value Accounting Hierarchy and the Impact of 
Firm- and Country-Level Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
3.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I analyze the value relevance of the fair value accounting hierarchy and 
both the individual and joint impact that firm- and country-level corporate governance 
mechanisms have on the value relevance of fair value information. Even though there is 
significant debate in the academic literature about the reliability of fair value accounting 
estimates, research investigating methods by which these estimates can be improved is sparse. 
This study builds on the limited research available to improve our understanding of the 
relationship between corporate governance and fair value accounting. Specifically, this study 
builds on and extends research conducted by Song et al. (2010), Siekkinen (2016, 2017), and  
Mechelli and Cimini (2018). I extend this research by investigating an international sample of 
banks for a seven year period following the global financial crisis, and by simultaneously 
investigating the impact of firm- and country-level governance on the value relevance of the fair 
value hierarchy. Contrary to prior research, I find that level 3 fair value estimates are not value 
relevant without considering the impact of corporate governance. Moreover, I find that firm- and 
country-level governance act as substitutes for one another in the context of determining the 
value relevance of the fair value hierarchy. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it contributes to the fair 
value accounting literature and provides evidence on how investors view the fair value hierarchy 
during periods of economic normalcy, as opposed to periods of financial crises. It is necessary to 
conduct research during both periods to gain a complete understanding of the benefits and 
drawbacks of fair value accounting. Moreover, studying the value relevance over time provides 
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more information about the value relevance of the fair value hierarchy than is gained by studying 
it for a snapshot in time such as Song et al. (2010) or Siekkinen (2017) who use a sample 
covering three quarters of a single year, and only two years, respectively.  
Second, this study contributes to the corporate governance literature by investigating the 
ability of firm- and country-level governance mechanisms to improve the value relevance of the 
fair value estimates for a sample of international banks. Moreover, this study is among the first to 
simultaneously investigate the joint effect of firm- and country-level governance on the value 
relevance of the fair value hierarchy and, to the best of my knowledge, is the first to do so within 
a single regression specification.  
Finally, this study has practical implications for standard setters, regulators, and boards of 
directors. This study highlights concerns surrounding the decision usefulness of level 3 fair 
values and inconsistent disclosure practices that, contrary to the intentions of the standard setters, 
appears to lead to less transparency and comparability of the fair value hierarchy. Regulators will 
be interested in the finding that focusing on enacting quality, thoughtful regulations can help to 
improve the value relevance of the fair value estimates provided by firms within their country. 
Boards of directors will be interested in the finding that firm- and country-level governance 
mechanisms, within the context of value relevance, act as substitutes for one another. Thus, 
boards of directors for firms in countries with low country-level governance can enact stronger 
firm-level governance mechanisms to increase the transparency of the fair value hierarchy, 
thereby enriching the information environment of a firm and leading to a lower cost of capital. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews relevant literature 
on corporate governance and the interface between corporate governance and fair value 
accounting. Section 3.3 develops the hypotheses and section 3.4 presents the sample and model 
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used to test the hypotheses. Section 3.5 presents the main results of the paper and section 3.6 
details the robustness tests that have been performed. Finally, section 3.7 provides a discussion 
of the results and concludes the chapter.  
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Corporate Governance 
 One of the major concerns about fair value accounting is the lack of reliability of level 2 
and especially level 3 estimates due to their potential for managerial bias and/or manipulation. 
The concern about level 2 and level 3 fair value estimates is compounded by information 
asymmetry and the agency problem. In light of this concern, corporate governance measures are 
an important mechanism by which these reliability concerns can be mitigated. The importance of 
corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating the principal-agent problem is well documented 
in the literature (Armstrong, Guay, & Weber, 2010). Moreover, corporate governance attributes 
have been shown to enhance monitoring over financial reporting (Lin & Hwang, 2010). In 
keeping with Zingales (1998), I define firm-level corporate governance as a set of mechanisms 
used by shareholders to ensure the efficient use of corporate resources by the managers of the 
firm. While similar to other companies in many respects, financial institutions are unique in 
many ways, which presents additional corporate governance challenges. Financial institutions 
tend to be much more complex and suffer a greater level of opaqueness when compared to other 
industries (Adams & Mehran, 2012; Macey & O’Hara, 2003; Prowse, 1997). The complexities 
of financial institutions make it difficult for stakeholders to monitor the bank, thus exacerbating 
the governance problem (de Andres & Vallelado, 2008).  
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In addition to differences in governance issues at the firm level, financial institutions 
draw a disproportionate amount of interest by governments because of the importance of the 
relationship between the performance of financial institutions and the overall health of a 
country’s economy (Adams & Mehran, 2003; Levine, 2004). Due to this relationship, banks are 
subject to much greater regulation and government intervention than is typical of other industries 
(Adams & Mehran, 2003; de Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Levine, 2004). While regulations can 
have implications at the level of the individual bank, they are applied at the industry level and 
can be expected to differ between, but not within, countries (Barth, 2007). Moreover, extant 
research has found that regulatory oversight can act as a monitoring mechanism that can partially 
substitute the external audit (Boo & Sharma, 2008). Thus, in the context of financial institutions, 
the regulations associated with this industry can act as a measure of country-level corporate 
governance (Boo & Sharma, 2008; de Andres & Vallelado, 2008). 
While regulations are especially important to consider when investigating the financial 
industry from an international perspective, research has identified the importance of additional 
country-level factors in corporate governance (Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2007). Previous studies 
have used a range of proxies to investigate differences in country and institutional settings. Some 
of the most common proxies used as a measure of country-level governance are the origin and 
attributes of the legal system, specifically those items that proxy for investor protection i.e. 
judicial efficiency, rule of law, and corruption (Brown, Preiato, & Tarca, 2014; La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). Building on this early research, studies then began to 
distinguish between public (state funded securities regulators) enforcement and private 
enforcement measures (Jackson & Roe, 2009; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2006). 
Still further research investigated enforcement activity designed to promote compliance with 
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accounting standards (Christensen, Hail, & Leuz, 2013; Hitz, Ernstberger, & Stich, 2012; 
Preiato, Brown, & Tarca, 2013). 
 Recently, studies use an index created by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011) 
designed to capture country-level governance. This index is created using hundreds of individual 
items that are factor analyzed and reduced to six key factors. These six factors are then typically 
reduced to a single variable through a simple average. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) utilize the 
Kaufmann et al. (2011) index and find that the “institutions” of a country are significantly and 
positively associated with the buy and hold returns during the period July 2007 to December 
2008. Erkens, Hung, & Matos (2012) also use the Kaufmann et al. (2011) index as well as an 
index representing anti-director rights, which was developed by Spamann (2010), to investigate 
the relationship of country-level governance on firm performance. In contrast to Beltratti and 
Stulz (2012), Erkens et al. (2012) do not find a significant relationship between the measures of 
country-level governance and performance. Finally, Bonetti, Magnan, and Parbonetti (2016) use 
the Kaufmann et al. (2011) measure to investigate the interplay between firm-level governance 
and country-level governance in shaping financial reporting quality for a sample of European 
firms around the adoption of IFRS. Their findings indicate that firm-level and country-level 
governance mechanisms act as substitutes when the legal system in a country is lax, but act as 
complements when the legal system is strong. Overall, this research highlights the importance of 
considering both firm-level and country-level corporate governance mechanisms when 
investigating an international sample. 
3.2.2 Intersection of Fair Value Accounting and Corporate Governance 
 Even though many of the concerns surrounding fair value accounting could seemingly be 
addressed by strong corporate governance mechanisms, the literature investigating the 
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intersections of these two areas is limited. Although this paper’s focus is not on the financial 
crisis, much of the recent research on banking has been shaped by this event. The research that 
has subsequently emerged has primarily focused on either corporate governance or fair value 
accounting, but rarely focuses on these two topics simultaneously. Song et al (2010) stands in 
stark contrast to the bulk of the recent literature focusing on financial institutions in that they 
investigate the impact that corporate governance mechanisms had on value relevance of fair 
value accounting during the financial crisis. Song et al. (2010) recognize that information 
asymmetry is at the heart of questions about the relevance and reliability of fair value accounting 
(Riedl & Serafeim, 2011), and that corporate governance mechanisms can be used to increase the 
richness and quality of the information environment of a firm (Verriest, Gaeremynck, & 
Thornton, 2013). Using a sample of U.S. financial institutions, the initial results show that the 
information provided by the fair value hierarchy outlined in SFAS 157 is value relevant and 
considered to be reliable enough to be incorporated into share prices. Furthermore, the results 
show that the coefficient on level 3 assets (liabilities) is significantly less positive (more 
negative) than the coefficient on level 1 and level 2 assets (liabilities). The introduction of the 
governance mechanisms to the study shows that governance has a significant impact on level 2 
and level 3 fair values.  
 In a similar vein to Song et al. (2010), Kolev (2019) also investigates the association 
between stock price and the fair value hierarchy, with a particular interest on level 2 and level 3 
fair values. Using a large sample of U.S. financial institutions, the results show that, similar to 
Song et al. (2010), there is a positive association between share price and the fair value hierarchy 
estimates. Moreover, Kolev (2019) documents results that are suggestive of investors placing 
less weight on mark-to-model estimates relative to mark-to-market estimates. Finally, Kolev 
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(2019) finds that investors perceive mark-to-model estimates to be more reliable for firms with: 
high equity capital, more than one financial expert on the audit committee, and for when the 
estimates are obtained from an independent third party. That is, when management either has less 
ability to influence the reported fair values, or for instances when their incentives are more 
closely aligned with the shareholders, investors perceive the reported model based fair values to 
be comparatively more reliable.  
 Bhat (2013) investigates the relationship between disclosures about risk management, 
corporate governance, and the market pricing of fair value gains and losses. In contrast to the 
previous studies mentioned, this one investigates the relevance and reliability of the reported fair 
value accounting gains and losses rather than the specific amount of fair values reported. Using 
data on U.S. banks from both a pre- and during crisis period, the results show that the market 
price of fair value gains and losses increases as the level of risk management disclosure 
increases. Moreover, the results show that strong corporate governance is associated with 
increased risk management disclosure, which in turn results in market participants finding the 
fair value gains and losses to be more relevant and reliable. Overall, this paper links the 
importance of corporate governance to fair value accounting in a similar vein as Song et al. 
(2010) and Kolev (2019). 
 More recently, three papers focus on the post crisis period. Siekkinen (2016) investigates 
the impact of different investor protection environments on the value relevance of fair values. 
Using an international sample of banks from 2012 – 2014, the results suggest that firms from 
countries with stronger investor protection environments disclose more value relevant fair value 
estimates. Siekkinen (2017) investigates the impact of individual board characteristics on the 
value relevance of fair values for a sample of international banks. Using data from 2012 and 
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2013, Siekkinen (2017) finds mixed results on the effect of individual board characteristics on 
the value relevance of fair values. More specifically, this study finds that board independence, 
gender diversity, and board size have a significant effect on the value relevance of level 3 assets 
only. However, the frequency of audit committee meetings has a marginal effect on level 1 assets 
only and the presence of a risk committee has a significant positive effect on level 2 assets, but a 
significant negative effect on the value relevance of level 1 assets. Finally, Mechelli and Cimini 
(2018) is, to my knowledge, the first paper to investigate the joint effect of firm- and country-
level governance on the value relevance of fair value estimates. Using a sample of 91 
international banks over the period 2011 – 2015, and running independent regressions on four 
sample clusters, results show that the country-level legal system affects both the value relevance 
of fair value estimates and the effectiveness of firm-level corporate governance mechanisms in 
alleviating concerns surrounding fair value estimates.1 
3.3 Hypothesis Development 
 In setting the standards surrounding FVA, both the FASB and IASB have explicitly 
considered the trade-off between relevance and reliability (Landsman, 2007). Fair value 
accounting information is considered to be relevant if the information provided in the FVA 
disclosures is found to be incrementally useful, over recognized book values, to users of financial 
statements. In order to test this incremental usefulness, academics typically investigate whether 
FVA is incrementally associated with either share prices or returns (Landsman, 2007). The 
relevance of fair value accounting has been studied fairly extensively within the academic 
literature, in both the context of the United States and internationally, and some general 
 
1 The four sample clusters represent the combinations of high/low quality governance and high/low quality legal 
system, split at the median. Cluster sizes range from 104 firm-year observations (approximately 20 firms) to 123 
firm-year observations (approximately 25 firms). 
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conclusions have been reached. Prior to the introduction of the fair value hierarchy, the literature 
has found that FVA information is incrementally useful over recognized book values, and is thus 
considered to be value relevant to users of financial statements (Barth, 1994; Barth, Beaver, & 
Landsman, 1996; Barth & Clinch, 1998; Eccher, Ramesh, & Thiagarajan, 1996; Venkatachalam, 
1996).  
 Since the introduction of the fair value hierarchy, a few studies have investigated the 
value relevance of each level of the hierarchy. The results from this literature, while performed 
primarily on U.S. financial institutions, is consistent with prior research in that the additional 
information provided by separating fair values into different levels is considered to be value 
relevant to investors. Specifically, Song et al. (2010) and Kolev (2019), both using a sample of 
U.S. financial institutions from 2008, find that each of the fair value estimates provided by the 
fair value hierarchy are significantly associated with the firms’ share price. Similarly, Liao, 
Kang, Morris, & Tang (2013), find that changes in fair value assets, as reported under the fair 
value hierarchy, are significantly associated with changes in the bid-ask spread when it is rising, 
but not when it is falling. They conclude that the fair value hierarchy offers add itional 
information to investors (Magnan et al., 2015). Thus, my first hypothesis is: 
H1a: The fair value estimates, as defined by the fair value hierarchy, are value relevant to  
investors 
While it is hard to argue that fair value accounting information is less relevant than 
historical cost accounting, from either a conceptual or an empirical point of view, arguments 
against the reliability of FVA are easier to come by. Indeed, Watts (2003, p. 219) suggests that 
standard-setters need to focus on the core competence of accountants, which is “providing 
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verifiable conservative information that market participants can use both as inputs in their own 
valuation and as calibration for their own and others’ unverifiable information”. Ramanna and 
Watts (2012) provide further arguments for the unverifiable nature of FVA with respect to the 
magnitude of goodwill impairments. Fair value accounting, with its three-level approach, and the 
ability to mark-to-model, does lead to more opportunities, relative to historical cost accounting, 
for managerial discretion as the model inputs are unable to be verified (Kolev, 2019; Ramanna & 
Watts, 2012). 
The reliability concerns surrounding the fair value hierarchy appear to have some support 
within the literature. Specifically, both Song et al. (2010) and Kolev (2019), while finding that 
each of the fair value level estimates are value relevant, document a decrease in the coefficient 
values further away from their theoretical value of one. Thus, while still deemed value relevant 
by investors, it would appear as though investors place less weight on fair value estimates that 
are the result of managerial models (level 3) compared to the weight placed on estimates that are 
the result of market values (level 1). This finding is consistent with the notion that investors are 
concerned that management, due to the information asymmetry between managers and owners, 
might have a bias or be acting opportunistically in the calculation of the level 3 estimate. Liao et 
al. (2013) directly test the impact of the fair value hierarchy on information asymmetry during 
the financial crisis. Their results find a positive relationship between the fair value hierarchy and 
the bid-ask spread. That is, the bid-ask spread is the lowest for level 1 fair value estimates and 
highest for level 3 fair value estimates.  
On the surface, the reliability concerns appear to be well founded. However, Altamuro 
and Zhang (2013) highlight an inherent flaw in the fair value hierarchy. The hierarchy implies, 
and was indeed written with the intention, that recording an asset at a higher numerical level (i.e. 
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at level 3 instead of level 2) is worse than if it were recorded at a lower numerical level. That is, 
the natural assumption is that an asset recorded at level 2 is necessarily better and more reliable 
than an asset recorded at level 3. Using an admittedly specialized asset, Altamuro and Zhang 
(2013) empirically present a scenario that demonstrates level 3 mortgage servicing rights better 
reflect the cash flow and risk factors of the underlying asset than level 2 mortgage servicing 
rights. Moreover, their study shows that, because of the assumption the level 2 estimates are 
necessarily better than level 3 estimates, 25% of their sample firms actually record this highly 
specialized asset that, for all intents and purposes, should be recorded as a level 3 asset, as a level 
2 asset. Thus, rather than using level 3 estimates opportunistically, managers can also use this 
estimate as a signalling device to convey private information to investors. 
Goh et al. (2015) investigate a sample of U.S. financial institutions for a period covering 
the financial crisis and the early years of the recovery. The pattern of results are consistent with 
those in Song et al. (2010) in finding that investors more heavily discount level 3 fair value 
estimates. However, Goh et al. (2015) are able to investigate this relationship over time and they 
find that, as market conditions began to stabilize, so did the value that investors placed on level 3 
fair value estimates, such that by 2011, the value investors placed on the different levels of the 
fair value hierarchy were not statistically different from one another. In keeping with this 
finding, Siekkinen (2017) investigates a sample of international financial institutions for the 
years 2012 and 2013 and documents that, while all three levels of the hierarchy are value 
relevant, they were not statistically different from one another. 
The research on the reliability of the fair value hierarchy is still rather limited in both 
volume and in scope. Both Song et al. (2010) and Kolev (2019) focus strictly on a sample of U.S. 
banks and is exclusively during the global financial crisis. Liao et al. (2013) and Goh et al. 
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(2015) also focus on a sample of U.S. banks with their samples encompassing the financial crisis 
and extending into the early stages of recovery. Finally, Siekkinen (2017) is the first paper to 
consider an international sample. Siekkinen (2017) documents a pattern of results that is 
consistent with Goh et al. (2015), but for which the coefficients on the fair value hierarchy differ 
significantly from the theoretically predicted value of 1 (Song et al., 2010). It is clear from the 
conflicting evidence that additional research is necessary to understand the value relevance of the 
fair value hierarchy. Thus, I hypothesize: 
H1b: The value relevance of each level of the fair value hierarchy is contingent on its  
perceived reliability 
Level 3 and, to a lesser extent level 2, fair value estimates are susceptible to managerial 
influence by their very definition. These estimates require the judgement and expertise of 
managers, which raises moral hazard concerns (Kothari, Ramanna, & Skinner, 2010). The 
judgements made by managers can be used to signal their private information to investors or 
managers could use their informational advantage over investors by acting opportunistically. 
Even still, managers could unintentionally impart their own bias into the estimates. Extant 
literature has found that firm-level corporate governance mechanisms are essential to align the 
interests of managers with those of the shareholders in an effort to minimize moral hazard 
concerns. One of the reasons that moral hazard arises is due to information asymmetry. That is, 
the manager has more information than the shareholders have and has the ability to provide 
misleading information to the shareholder as a result of having a richer information environment. 
Verriest et al. (2013) find that firms with stronger corporate governance disclose more, and better 
quality, information to shareholders and use IAS 39’s carve-out provision less opportunistically. 
Disclosing more and better quality information to shareholders ultimately increases the richness 
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of the information environment for investors, which can result in fewer concerns surrounding 
more opaque assets. Riedl and Serafeim (2011) examine a sample of U.S. financial institutions 
and find evidence consistent with the notion that more level 3 financial assets (more opaque) are 
associated with an increased cost of capital, but that differences in the information environment 
is an important factor that can mitigate this information risk.  
Song et al. (2010) investigate the effect of corporate governance on the value relevance 
of the fair value hierarchy and find evidence consistent with the notion that stronger corporate 
governance is associated with higher value relevance of level 3 fair values. The major caveat to 
this finding is that the sample investigated U.S. banks during the period of the financial crisis. 
Laux and Leuz (2010) find evidence that transfers of assets to level 3 increased significantly as 
the crisis deepened. Thus, it is unclear if the relationship between corporate governance and 
more opaque fair value estimates is an ongoing concern, or if it is an artifact of the time period 
and distressed markets. Concerns surrounding the persistence of the influence of corporate 
governance mechanisms on fair value estimates subject to managerial input are exacerbated by 
the findings in Goh et al. (2015) and Siekkinen (2017). Without investigating the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms, Goh et al. (2015) find that the pricing of the different fair 
value levels began to stabilize over time. Siekkinen (2017) finds inconsistent evidence for the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the fair value hierarchy. Testing five different 
corporate governance mechanisms independently resulted in the predicted effect on level 3 
estimates under three of the five scenarios, the predicted effect on level 2 estimates under only 
one of the five scenarios, and the opposite effect on level 1 estimates in one of the five scenarios 
(Siekkinen, 2017). The role that firm level corporate governance mechanisms plays in the pricing 
of fair value estimates remains an empirical question. Thus, my second hypothesis is: 
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H2: Stronger firm-level corporate governance mechanisms has a positive impact on the  
value relevance of level 2 and level 3 fair value estimates, with a greater impact on level 
3 estimates 
Institutions do not operate in a vacuum. In addition to their responsibilities to 
shareholders and other stakeholders, institutions are subject to the laws and regulations of the 
country in which they operate. The seminal work by La Porta et al. (1998) highlights the 
importance of the legal environment of a country in situations where managers might act in their 
own interest rather than the interests of the shareholders. Countries with a strong legal 
environment provides shareholders with the means and power to protect their investment from 
managerial opportunism. Moreover, managers operating firms in a country with a strong legal 
environment have additional incentives, beyond firm-level corporate governance mechanisms, to 
act in a manner consistent with the interests of the shareholders. Research has strongly supported 
the view that stronger legal environments and stronger investor protection regimes is important 
for financial markets, has a negative effect on earnings management, a positive effect on 
earnings quality, and is a determinant of high quality financial statement numbers (Ball, Kothari, 
& Robin, 2000; Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003; Cai, Rahman, & Courtenay, 2014; Daske, Hail, Leuz, 
& Verdi, 2008; Francis & Wang, 2008; Hope, Jin, & Kang, 2006; La Porta et al., 2006, 2000, 
1998; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003).  
Despite the concerns surrounding potential managerial manipulation of fair value 
estimates, and the documented importance of country-level governance in curbing managerial 
opportunism, research investigating the impact of country-level governance on the value 
relevance of fair value estimates is almost non-existent. Siekkinen (2016) and Mechelli and 
Cimini (2018) are, to the best of my knowledge, the only studies that investigate this impact to 
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date. Splitting a sample of international banks from 2012-2014 into three clusters based on 
strong, medium, and weak country-level governance, Siekkinen (2016) finds that all levels of the 
fair value hierarchy are value relevant under the strong and medium investor protection regimes, 
whereas only level 1 fair value estimates are value relevant in a weak investor protection 
environment. Interestingly, in the strong investor protection environment, the value relevance of 
level 2 estimates is greater than both level 1 and level 3 estimates, which are not significantly 
different from one another. In the medium protection environment, level 1 and level 2 estimates 
are not significantly different from one another, but both are greater than the level 3 estimate. 
Unfortunately, the results presented in Siekkinen (2016) do not make it possible to compare the 
coefficients across regression specifications. It appears as though the results are generally 
consistent with the notion that investor protection is positively associated with the value 
relevance of fair values, the medium protection environment appears to provide results most 
closely aligned with expectations. That is, the value relevance of level 2 and level 3 fair value 
estimates appears to be highest under the medium protection environment, rather than the strong 
protection environment. Similar to Siekkinen (2016), Mechelli and Cimini (2018) split a small 
sample of international banks from 2011 – 2015 into two clusters based on high- and low-quality 
legal system. Mechelli and Cimini (2018) find that level 1 and level 2 assets are positive and 
significant under the high-quality legal system, but only level 1 fair values are significant under 
the low-quality legal system. Thus, I formulate my third hypothesis as follows: 
H3: Stronger country-level governance mechanisms will have a positive impact on fair 
value estimates, with the greatest effect being on level 3 estimates 
 The literature demonstrating the importance of both firm- and country-level governance 
is robust, but despite this, these topics are often investigated independently of one another 
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(Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010). Recently the literature has begun to close this gap by recognizing 
the importance of simultaneously investigating firm- and country-level governance (Bebchuk & 
Hamdani, 2009). Doidge et al. (2007) find evidence that firm- and country-level governance 
mechanism act as complements to one another. Conversely, Durnev & Kim (2005) find that 
firm-level governance can substitute for country-level governance when the latter is weak. 
Similarly, Ernstberger and Grüning (2013) also find that firm- and country-level governance 
mechanisms can act as substitutes for one another. Chen, Chen, and Wei (2009) and Bruno and 
Claessens (2010) both document that the positive effect of strong firm-level governance is 
greater in countries that have weak legal environments. Bonetti et al. (2016) helps to bridge the 
gap in the conflicting research with their finding that firm-level governance acts as a substitute 
for country-level governance when enforcement is weak, but complements country-level 
governance when enforcement is strong. Finally, Mechelli and Cimini (2018) partition a sample 
of international banks into four clusters representing the combinations of high and low firm-level 
and country-level governance. In their study, level 3 assets are only positive and significant when 
both firm- and country-level governance is high, which suggest a complementary effect when 
governance is high. Furthermore, the result that level 2 assets are positive and significant when 
firm-level governance is high (low) and country-level governance is low (high), suggests a 
substitutive effect. Taken together, these results support the notion that studying the joint effect 
of firm- and country-level governance is important and necessary to gain a better understanding 
of the overall impact of governance. Thus, my fourth hypothesis, which I formulate as follows: 
H4a: Firm-level governance mechanisms will complement strong country-level 
governance in impacting the value relevance of the fair value hierarchy. 
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H4b: Firm-level governance mechanisms will substitute weak country-level governance 
in impacting the value relevance of the fair value hierarchy 
3.4 Data and Research Design 
3.4.1 Sample Selection 
 In order to maximize the power of my value relevance tests, I focus on the financial 
services industry as these firms have significant levels of assets and liabilities reported at fair 
value on a recurring basis (Song et al., 2010). I identified my sample of firms first using the 
screener tool provided by the SNL Financial “Companies” database. From this database, I 
obtained a list of all Banking and Specialty Finance companies covered by SNL Financial for 
Canada and Europe, regardless of the coverage level.2 During the course of my sample 
collection, S&P Capital IQ Market Intelligence platform subsumed the SNL Financial database. 
As part of this process, the SNL Financial database remained intact and was accessed through the 
“Companies” database as above. However, the merger provided access to previously unavailable 
information through the “Companies (Beta)” database, available through the same screener tool. 
This database provided access to the original SNL Financial database information as well as 
access to information provided by S&P Capital IQ Fundamentals. As a result, the process of 
identifying my sample firms was repeated on this secondary database with the results of the two 
databases being combined and duplicates being removed. This provided the base number of 
observations in my sample.  
 The period covered by this study is 2011 – 2017 and this period was selected for two 
main reasons. First, as this study is covering an international sample of firms, and taking 
 
2 SNL Financial covered firms at two different levels: Full Coverage and Summary Coverage. Firms that are 
covered at a  summary level are still included in the initial stages as many of these compa nies have the required 
information available, albeit in a different database or through manual collection. 
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advantage of the fact that IFRS are used across Europe and in Canada, it is necessary to ensure 
that IFRS had been adopted in a given country. While the majority of Europe adopted IFRS in 
2005, Canada did not adopt it until 2011, when it became the standard for most publicly 
accountable enterprises (IFRS Foundation, 2017). Second, the global financial crisis had ended 
by 2011 with countries well on the road to recovery. As a result, the time period of this study 
allows for an investigation of FVA during a period where global capital markets are not 
distressed. 
 The initial sample from the SNL Financial and S&P Capital IQ Fundamentals database 
consisted of 3241 firm-year observations from 46 countries. Of this sample, 968 observations 
were determined to be either missing, or have unreliable (as explained in Financial Variables 
section below), fair value information. However, of those 968 observations, 859 observations 
remained in the sample due to hand collection/verification. Of the initial sample, the share price 
four months after the fiscal year end was missing for 626 observations. Focusing on firms that 
had strictly incomplete share price information, 70 observations were hand collected. Finally, 
complete firm-level governance information was missing for 2,557 observations of the initial 
sample. Again, focusing on firms that had incomplete information, 388 observations were hand 
collected. In order to exclude as few observations as possible, relevant portions of non-English 
annual reports were translated into English for hand collected observations. 
 Table 1, Panel A details the sample selection process. From the initial sample of 3,241 
firm-year observations, after hand collection, 556 observations were removed due to the lack of 
share price information four months after the fiscal year end, 689 observations were dropped due 
to a lack of information on the fair value hierarchy, and 1,064 observations were removed 
because of a lack of firm-level corporate governance data. Firms with a share price less than 
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$0.10 USD or greater than $1,000 USD, representing 35 observations, were also removed from 
the sample. The extreme nature of share prices outside these ranges, relative to the minimum 
absolute share price change, could introduce noise to the value relevance equation (Siekkinen, 
2017). Finally, in order to avoid the effect of extreme outliers, 27 observations with studentized 
residuals from Equation (1) greater (less) than two standard deviations above (below) the mean 
were removed.3 This procedure resulted in a final sample of 870 firm-year observations across 
29 countries available to test the hypotheses. See Table 1, Panel B for the distribution of 
observations by country and Table 1, Panel C for the distribution of observations by year. 
[ Insert Table 1 About Here] 
3.4.2 Value Relevance Model 
 In order to investigate my research hypotheses, I use a modified Ohlson (1995) model to 
test the association between share prices and the fair value of assets and liabilities per share. This 
model has been used extensively in the literature (Barth & Clinch, 2009; Mechelli & Cimini, 
2018; Siekkinen, 2017; Song et al., 2010; Tsalavoutas, André, & Evans, 2012) and evidence 
provided by Barth and Clinch (2009) demonstrates that share deflated specifications better 
reduce scale effects associated with the Ohlson (1995) model than do alternative specifications. 
The specification used to test H1a and H1b is as follows: 
 𝑆𝑃4𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖,𝑡  
                                    +𝛽6𝐹𝑉𝐿12𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑉𝐿3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡 ( 1 ) 
 
3 Siekkinen (2017) and Song et al. (2010) classify outliers as observations whose studentized residua ls have an 
absolute value greater than 2. Untabulated results using this definition resulted in the removal of an additional 10 
observations from the current sample, but did not affect interpretation of the coefficients of interest.  
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where SP4 is the closing share price four months after the end of the fiscal year; BV is the per 
share book value of assets less liabilities that are not carried at fair value on a recurring basis; 
FVA1 is the fair value of assets disclosed in level 1 on a recurring basis; FVA2 is the fair value 
of assets disclosed in level 2 on a recurring basis; FVA3 is the fair value of assets disclosed in 
level 3 on a recurring basis; FVL12 is the fair value of liabilities disclosed in both level 1 and 
level 2 on a recurring basis; FVL3 is the fair value of liabilities disclosed in level 3 on a 
recurring basis; and NI is the net income available to common shareholders. All financial values 
in equation 1 have been deflated by the number of common shares outstanding. Fair value 
liabilities reported in level 1 and level 2 have been aggregated in keeping with prior studies 
(Mechelli & Cimini, 2018; Siekkinen, 2017; Song et al., 2010). 
 In order to test H2 and investigate the impact of firm-level corporate governance 
mechanisms on the value relevance of the fair value levels I use the following specification of 
the modified Ohlson (1995) model:4 
 𝑆𝑃4𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖,𝑡 
          +𝛽6𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖 ,𝑡 
                     +𝛽9𝐹𝑉𝐿12𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐹𝑉𝐿3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡 ( 2 ) 
Equation 2 is essentially equivalent to equation 1 except for the fair value asset levels being 
interacted with a dummy variable, GOV, representing firms with either high (1) or low (0) firm-
level corporate governance. 
 
4 It could be argued that the firm-level governance variable should be included in the model as in Siekkinen, 2017 
and Song et al., 2010. Alternatively, as this is a  valuation model, including the governance variable on its own 
implies a direct effect of corporate governance on the share price of a firm, rather than the effect of modifying the 
fair value assets. Untabulated results show that the interpretation of the coefficients of interest are not affected by the 
inclusion or exclusion of the firm-level governance variable on its own. 
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 In order to test H3 and investigate the impact of country-level governance on the value 
relevance of the fair value levels, the following specification of the modified Ohlson (1995) 
model is used: 
𝑆𝑃4𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖,𝑡  
                       +𝛽6𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡  
                       +𝛽9𝐹𝑉𝐿12𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐹𝑉𝐿3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡 ( 3 ) 
Equation 3 is equivalent to equation 2 except that the firm-level governance variable has been 
replaced by a country-level governance variable representing firms whose headquarters reside in 
a country with either high (1) or low (0) country-level governance. 
 In order to test H4a and H4b and investigate the interplay between firm- and country-
level governance, I use the following specification of the modified Ohlson (1995) model:5 
𝑆𝑃4𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖,𝑡 
                                    +𝛽6𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡 
                                    +𝛽9𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡 
                                +𝛽12𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖 ,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
                    +𝛽14𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐹𝑉𝐿12𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐹𝑉𝐿3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  ( 4 ) 
Equation (4) builds on Equation (2) and Equation (3) by including three-way interactions 
between the fair value asset levels and firm- and country-level governance mechanisms which 
will allow for the effects of firm- and country-level governance to be investigated 
simultaneously. 
 
5 As with equation 2 and equation 3, untabulated results show that the inclusion or exclusion of standalone versions 
of either the firm- or country-level variables has no effect on the interpretation of the variables of interest. 
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3.4.3 Financial Variables 
 The financial data for the sample firms is collected from the SNL Financial database, the 
S&P Capital IQ Fundamentals database, and Bloomberg. As the various countries report in 
different currencies, data is obtained from SNL Financial and S&P Capital IQ in USD in order to 
maintain a common currency throughout. Data from Bloomberg is obtained in the reported 
currency and is manually converted to USD using the exchange rate provided by SNL 
Financial/S&P Capital IQ.6 Since the data on total assets/liabilities, fair value level information, 
and net income is collected from three separate primary sources, it is necessary to prioritize the 
sources. For the fair value level data, this study is concerned with the fair value of assets and 
liabilities recorded at fair value on a recurring basis. This information is available, with 
consistency, in the SNL Financial database for “Full” coverage firms and in the Bloomberg 
database. SNL Financial data is given priority over Bloomberg data as SNL Financial is my 
primary source. The S&P Capital IQ database was useful in identifying companies for which 
additional fair value level information is available (i.e. firms SNL Financial covers at a 
“Summary” level). However, the fair value level information contained  in this database is 
inconsistent and inaccurate for the purposes of this study. More specifically, IFRS 13, which 
became effective for annual periods beginning on or after January 1, 2013, implemented new fair 
value measurement and disclosure requirements that resulted in many companies disclosing the 
fair value hierarchy for assets and liabilities that are measured at fair value on a recurring or non-
recurring basis (IFRS 13.91A). S&P Capital IQ Fundamentals reports the fair value level for the 
 
6 While the difference in exchange rates between SNL Financial/S&P Capital and Bloomberg is minor, a  common 
exchange rate is used to eliminate concerns of a difference in rates influencing the results. 
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sum of assets/liabilities measured at fair value on a recurring basis and non-recurring basis.7 See 
Appendix 1 – 6 for different examples of the change in disclosure. There is no identifiable way 
to determine, from the database alone, if the firm reported the fair value hierarchy for 
assets/liabilities measured at amortized cost, thus the fair value hierarchy information from S&P 
Capital IQ for years 2013 – 2017 is not considered reliable for this study. However, the existence 
of hierarchical information in the S&P Capital IQ database is evidence that this information is 
readily available in the annual report of the firms in question. Thus, firms in my sample for 
which no hierarchical information is available through SNL Financial or Bloomberg, but is 
available from S&P Capital IQ, are identified and this information is manually collected from the 
annual reports. 
Data on total assets, total liabilities, and net income, is not expected to differ among the 
three databases.8 As a result, SNL Financial data was given priority, followed by S&P Capital IQ 
Fundamentals, and finally Bloomberg data was used if neither of the first two databases had the 
required information.9 Total assets (total liabilities) are utilized for the sole purpose of 
calculating the value for non-fair value assets (non-fair value liabilities) and is calculated as total 
assets (total liabilities) less the sum of the fair value assets (liabilities) hierarchy. Non-fair value 
assets and non-fair value liabilities are used to calculate the book value of equity excluding 
assets and liabilities carried at fair value. The net income figure used was net income available to 
common shareholders.  
 
7 The inclusion of this data, as is, would result in significant concerns surrounding the integrity of the data. Most of 
these assets were classified as Level 3 assets and would often result in a scenario where the fair value of assets 
exceeded the total value of assets reported on the balance sheet . 
8 The database values are compa red to one another and no significant differences are found. 
9 S&P Capital IQ Fundamentals is given priority over Bloomberg for these variables as this negated the requirement 
of manually incorporating the exchange rate to convert the values to USD. 
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The share price data is obtained, as above, from multiple databases. More specifically, 
the databases used, in order of priority given to the data, are SNL Financial, S&P Capital IQ, 
Compustat, and Bloomberg. SNL Financial, S&P Capital IQ, and Bloomberg all retroactively 
adjust their share price variables based on stock splits and reverse stock splits, but Compustat 
does not. However, Compustat does provide an adjustment factor to account for the retroactive 
effect of stock splits. The share price is the closing price four months after the fiscal year end, 
which is consistent with (Barth, Landsman, Young, & Zhuang, 2014; Siekkinen, 2017; 
Tsalavoutas et al., 2012), who use samples composed of European firms. These studies 
investigate alternative dates for share price and find that the closing share prices four months 
after the fiscal year end ensures that the accounting information for the previous fiscal year has 
entered the public domain.  
The total number of common shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year is used to 
deflate all financial variables in this study. As with the share price data above, I use multiple 
databases to obtain the common shares outstanding and maintain the same database priority. 
Bloomberg data is treated as the lowest priority as this data is presented in thousands of shares, 
as opposed to the full number of shares.10 The adjustment factor provided by Compustat is 
incorporated into the data to ensure the effect of stock splits is taken into account. The 
retroactive adjustment of shares outstanding means that the number of shares outstanding used as 
a deflator is not necessarily the number of shares that were outstanding during a specific period. 
However, it does ensure that the number of shares outstanding is proportionally the same over 
time. Moreover, it also ensures that any changes in the number of shares outstanding are the 
 
10 The common shares outstanding value provided by Bloomberg is manually adjusted for this difference. Although 
the effect of this is minor, it is less accurate than the alternative sources. 
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result of actual transactions (i.e. issuances/share buybacks) rather than artificially introduced 
changes. 
3.4.4 Firm- and Country-level Corporate Governance Variables 
The strength of firm-level governance is measured by combining five commonly used 
attributes of governance through factor analysis (Bonetti et al., 2016; Mechelli & Cimini, 2018; 
Siekkinen, 2017; Song et al., 2010). To the extent stronger performance on individual facets of 
corporate governance results in stronger firm-level governance as a whole, this method should 
better reflect the actual underlying strength of corporate governance than a single measure 
(Bonetti et al., 2016; Bushman, Chen, Engel, & Smith, 2004; DeFond, Hann, & Xuesong, 2005). 
The firm-level governance data is collected from Bloomberg and the Datastream Asset4 
databases. The five governance attributes are: 1) board independence, measured as the number of 
independent directors divided by board size (INDEPENDENCE); 2) audit committee, 
represented as a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has an audit committee (AUDIT); 3) 
audit committee size (AC_SIZE); 4) audit committee independence, measured as the number of 
independent board members on the audit committee, divided by the size of the audit committee 
(AC_INDEPENDENCE); and 5) institutional ownership, represented as a dummy variable equal 
to one if the percentage of shares held by institutions is greater than 5% (INST_OWN).11 
 Table 2, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the firm- and country-level 
governance attributes. I then apply a principal component factor analysis on the five firm-level 
variables (Bonetti et al., 2016; Song et al., 2010). The first and primary factor exhibits the 
expected loadings, generating an eigenvalue of 2.032 and accounting for approximately 40.63% 
 
11 As in Bonetti et al. (2016), board size is not included in the governance factor score due to the mixed evidence on 




of the total variance in the original variables (Table 2, Panel B). The appropriateness of factor 
analysis was determined through a test of the intercorrelation between the governance variables. 
Using Bartlett’s (1951) test of sphericity, the null hypothesis that the variables are not 
intercorrelated was rejected at the 1% level (p < 0.000). Based on Horn’s (1965) parallel 
analysis, and a Monte Carlo extension by Glorfeld (1995) one factor was retained (Dinno, 2009). 
Descriptive statistics for the GOVSCORE variable generated by the factor analysis are reported 
in Table 2, Panel C. Finally, I take the firm-specific mean of GOVSCORE across the sample 
years and create a binary variable (GOV) based on the sample median of the firm-specific mean 
of GOVSCORE in order to create a time-invariant measure of the strength of firm-level 
corporate governance Bonetti et al. (2016).12 Firms with a score above (below) the sample 
median of the firm-specific mean of GOVSCORE are considered to have strong (weak) firm-
level corporate governance. Table 2, Panel D provides a breakdown of the sample firms by the 
strength of both firm-level and country-level governance mechanisms. Specifically, a binary 
variable (RULE) is created such that firms from countries with a rule of law score above (below) 
the sample mean are considered to have strong (weak) country-level governance.  
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
3.5 Results 
Table 3, Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the financial variables used in the 
analyses. The mean book value (BV) of non-fair value assets is -30.782 USD, which is consistent 
with prior literature investigating the value relevance of fair values (Goh et al., 2015; Mechelli & 
Cimini, 2018; Siekkinen, 2017; Song et al., 2010). While the mean net income available to 
 
12 As in Bonetti et al. (2016), this method does “not assume that board monitoring intensity does not vary over time. 
Instead [it] assumes that cross-sectional difference in board monitoring intensity across firms [does] not” (p. 1069) 
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common shareholders of -8.054 USD is skewed negative due to the presence of an extreme 
negative value, the median is 0.542 USD.13 The mean of Levels 1, 2, and 3 fair value assets is 
89.294, 117.214, and 18.04 USD, respectively. The mean of Levels 1 and 2, and Level 3 
liabilities is 146.869 and 16.793 USD, respectively. Finally, the mean share price four months 
following the fiscal year end is 21.428 USD. 
Table 3, Panel B reports the correlation coefficients for the financial variables used in the 
regression analyses. The correlations between the fair value asset levels are, as expected, 
positively associated with the share price four months after the fiscal year end. The fair value 
asset levels are positively associated with one another, indicating that firms that report higher 
values of level 1 assets, tend to report higher values for level 2 and level 3 assets. Finally, the 
correlation table offers preliminary evidence supporting the first hypothesis. Specifically, while 
all three levels of the fair value hierarchy are positively associated with share price, the 
correlation between level 3 fair value assets and share price is weaker than that of either level 1 
or level 2 fair value assets and share price. 
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
3.5.1 Multivariate Analyses 
 Table 4 reports the results from estimating Equation (1), which is used to test H1a and 
H1b. The results demonstrate mixed support for H1a, which is in contrast to prior literature (Goh 
et al., 2015; Mechelli & Cimini, 2018; Siekkinen, 2017; Song et al., 2010). As expected, the fair 
value of assets is positively associated, and the fair value of liabilities is negatively associated, 
with share prices. More specifically, while the coefficients for FVA1 and FVA2 are positive and 
 
13 Untabulated results eliminating this observation from the sample does not change the interpretation. 
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significant (0.303, p < 0.000; 0.304, p < 0.000 respectively), the coefficient for FVA3 is positive, 
but not statistically significant (0.075, p < 0.146). Thus, hypothesis H1a is only partially 
supported as the results indicate that, while investors view the fair value of level 1 and level 2 
assets to be value relevant, they do not view the fair value of level 3 assets to be value relevant. 
Table 4 also presents the results of F-tests used to test the hypothesis that the value relevance of 
the fair value asset levels is contingent on the perceived reliability. The results of the F-tests 
provide mixed support for H1b. The coefficient on FVA1 is not significantly larger than that of 
FVA2 (F = 0.00; p < 0.969), however, the difference between FVA2 and FVA3 is statistically 
significant (F = 32.66, p < 0.000). Moreover, the difference between FVA1 and FVA3 is also 
statistically significant (F = 77.77, p < 0.000). 
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
 The results testing the second hypothesis, estimating Equation (2), are presented in Table 
5. The coefficients of interest in this table are the sum of the coefficient on the individual fair 
value level and its corresponding coefficient interacted with the GOV binary variable. Consistent 
with hypothesis 2 the sum of the fair value level coefficients and the interaction with GOV is 
positive and significant. For level 1 assets, the sum of coefficients β3 (0.477) and β6 (-0.107) is 
0.370, which is positive and significant (F = 44.74; p < 0.000). The sum of coefficients for level 
2 assets, β4 (0.359) and β7 (0.040) is 0.399, which is positive and significant (F = 50.35; p < 
0.000). Finally, the sum of coefficients for level 3 assets, β5 (0.219) and β8 (0.056) is 0.275, 
which is positive and significant (F = 9.98; p < 0.002). These results suggest that considering 
firm-level governance when assessing the value relevance of fair value is particularly important 
for assets reported at level 3. Results for the first hypothesis showed that investors did not 
consider level 3 assets to be value relevant, but taking the firm-level governance into account 
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results in level 3 assets being value relevant, thus supporting the second hypothesis. Moreover, 
comparing the summed coefficients across levels of the fair value hierarchy indicates no 
significant difference in the value relevance between level 1 and level 2 or between level 1 and 
level 3 assets. Level 2 assets are marginally greater than level 3 assets. 
[Insert Table 5 About Here] 
 Table 6 reports the results from estimating Equation (3), which is used to test the third 
hypothesis. As with the test of hypothesis 2, the coefficients of interest are the sums of the fair 
value level and the corresponding interaction with the RULE binary variable. The results from 
this test supports the third hypothesis. For level 1 assets, the sum of coefficients β3 (0.279) and β6 
(0.054) is 0.333, which is positive and significant (F = 68.99; p < 0.000). The sum of coefficients 
for level 2 assets, β4 (0.383) and β7 (-0.107) is 0.276, which is also positive and significant (F = 
31.27; p < 0.000). Finally, the sum of coefficients for level 3 assets, β5 (0.081) and β8 (0.097) is 
0.178, which is also statistically significant (F = 13.13; p < 0.000). The third hypothesis posits 
that the greatest effect of country-level governance on the fair value estimates will be seen on 
level 3 estimates. Comparing the results to Equation (1) shows significant improvement in the 
value relevance of level 3 assets. Specifically, taking into consideration a strong legal 
environment results in investors determining that level 3 estimates are value relevant, which is 
not the case when country-level governance is not considered. Overall, the results support the 
third hypothesis. 
 [Insert Table 6 About Here] 
 The results from estimating Equation (4) are presented in Table 7. The coefficients of 
interest in this table are the sum of the coefficient on the individual fair value level and all 
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corresponding interaction coefficients. For level 1 assets, the sum of coefficients β3 (0.478), β6 (-
0.077), β9 (0.046), and β12 (-0.052) is 0.395, which is positive and significant (F = 55.08; p < 
0.000). The sum of coefficients for level 2 assets, β4 (0.555), β7 (-0.036), β10 (-0.169), and β13 
(0.085) is 0.435, which is positive and significant (F = 3676; p < 0.000). Finally, the sum of 
coefficients for level 3 assets, β5 (-0.393), β8 (0.749), β11 (0.743), and β14 (-0.699) is 0.400, 
which is positive and significant (F = 9.96; p < 0.002). Moreover, comparing the summed 
coefficients across the fair value hierarchy indicates that no significant differences exist in the 
value relevance of level 1, level 2, or level 3 fair value assets. That is, strong firm-level and 
strong country-level governance mechanisms are necessary for investors to consider the value 
relevance of each level of the fair value hierarchy to be equivalent.  
[Insert Table 7 About Here] 
The significant negative coefficient on the three-way interaction term for level 3 assets 
provides support for H4b and suggests that firm- and country-level governance act as substitutes 
for one another when they are both considered to be high. Table 8 contains the results of testing 
the difference in summed coefficients for level 3 fair value assets when both firm- and country-
level governance is high compared to when only one is high. When only firm-level governance is 
high, compared to both firm- and country-level governance, the relevant coefficients to test are 
β8 and β14. The sum of these coefficients is 0.050 and is not significantly different from zero (F = 
0.28; p = 0.595). Similarly, when only country-level governance is high, compared to both firm- 
and country-level governance, the relevant coefficients to test are β11 and β14. The sum of these 
coefficients is 0.044 and is not significantly different from zero (F = 0.01; p = 0.915). Thus, 
either strong firm- or country-level governance appears to be sufficient to ensure that level 3 fair 
value assets are value relevant and adding more governance does not improve the valuation. 
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 [Insert Table 8 About Here] 
3.6 Additional Analyses 
 To assess the robustness of my main results, I re-estimate each model using alternative 
variable specifications. First, I use two different specifications for my dependent variable to 
ensure that my results are not a product of my selected time period, similar to Barth et al. (2014) 
and Siekkinen (2017). The current study incorporates firms from Canada, which report quarterly 
as opposed to half-year reporting for European firms. As a result of using the closing share price 
four months after the fiscal year end, it could be argued that a small subset of firms provide 
additional guidance that is not provided for the whole sample. Untabulated results redefining my 
dependent variable to be the closing share price three months after the fiscal year end provides 
results that are qualitatively similar to my primary results, with a few exceptions. When 
estimating Equation (1), I find that there is a significant difference between the coefficients on 
level 1 and level 2 fair value assets, but I do not find a significant difference between level 1 and 
level 3 or level 2 and level 3 fair value assets. Estimating Equation (2) results in no significant 
differences between the summed coefficients for level 2 and level 3 fair value assets. Estimating 
Equation (3) results in no significance on the summed coefficients for level 3 assets and no 
significant difference between the summed coefficients for level 2 and level 3 fair value assets. 
In all regression specification tests using the three month share price as the dependent variable, 
the standard error associated with level 3 assets is substantially higher than with the four month 
share price and the explanatory power of the model is more than 20% lower. Higher explanatory 
power using the four month share price is consistent with Barth et al. (2014).  
 An additional alternative specification for my dependent variable is to use the three 
month share price for Canadian firms and the four month share price for European firms. 
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Untabulated results are identical to my main results with one minor difference. Specifically, the 
difference between the summed coefficients for level 1 and level 3 assets in Equation (2) is 
statistically significant at the 10% level (p = 0.0997 compared to p = 0.1099). The consistency of 
my main results, and the increased explanatory power, suggests that my results are not driven 
primarily by the time period of my dependent variable. 
 In addition to redefining my dependent variable, I also investigate two alternatives for my 
country-level governance variable. First, following Mechelli and Cimini (2018) I use principal 
component factor analysis to obtain a composite score of country-level governance, which I use 
to create a binary variable in the same manner as the main results. This score is comprised of all 
six dimensions of governance outlined in the Worldwide Governance Indicators project 
(Kaufmann et al., 2011). The six dimensions are: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability 
and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of 
Law, and Control of Corruption. Untabulated results are consistent with the main results with 
one minor difference. In Equation (4), there is a marginally significant difference between the 
summed coefficients for level 2 and level 3 assets, whereas this result is not significant in the 
main results. 
 Finally, instead of using a rule of law variable to measure country-level governance, I use 
the Financial Freedom attribute from the Index of Economic Freedom provided by The Heritage 
Foundation. The Financial Freedom attribute looks at banking efficiency, independence from 
government control, and the extent of regulations of financial services. As with the main results, 
a binary variable is created such that countries scoring above (below) the mean are considered to 
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have strong (weak) country-level governance.14 Untabulated results using a country-level 
variable representing regulations instead of rule of law are consistent with the main results with 
one minor difference. As with the previous robustness test using a factor analysis for the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, there is a marginally significant difference between the 
summed coefficients for level 2 and level 3 fair value assets when estimating Equation (4). 
3.7 Discussion 
 This chapter investigates the value relevance of the fair value hierarchy, and the 
individual and joint effect of firm- and country-level corporate governance on this value 
relevance, for a sample of international financial institutions in the post global financial crisis 
period. I find results for the value relevance of level 1 and level 2 fair values this is consistent 
with prior literature, but results for the value relevance of level 3 assets that is inconsistent with 
prior research. Specifically, in the absence of any form of corporate governance, I do not find 
level 3 fair values to be independently value relevant. A goal of IFRS is to enhance 
comparability and quality of financial information through increased transparency and an IFRS 
13 post implementation review, while noting some implementation challenges, concludes that 
the standard is working as intended (IFRS Foundation, 2018). However, the lack of significance 
for level 3 fair values, which are arguably the least transparent element of the fair value 
hierarchy, suggests this goal has not been met. The evidence provided in this study suggests that 
investors do not perceive level 3 fair values to be sufficiently reliable to include in their valuation 
of a firm. 
 
14 The index is constructed such that a higher score represents less government intervention. Notably, while this is 
often associated with fewer regulations, the regulations that exist are typically related to enforcing contrac tual 
obligations and preventing fraud. Thus, a greater absolute number of regulations is not considered to be indicative of 
strong country-level governance. This is consistent with findings that suggest tighter restrictions on bank activities 
and stringent regulations have negative effects on bank efficiency and performance (Barth, Lin, Ma, Seade, & Song, 
2013; Bruno & Claessens, 2010). 
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 One notable element of IFRS 13 disclosures that appears to be problematic is that IFRS 
13.97 requires banks to disclose the fair value hierarchy level for assets and liabilities that are not 
carried at fair value on a recurring basis, but for which fair value is otherwise disclosed (IAS 
Plus, 2011). The lack of standardization in disclosure practices results in a lack of clarity and 
comparability across companies. Appendix 1 provides an example of a subtle change in 
disclosure practices that resulted from IFRS 13. While it is stated, it is not immediately clear that 
the additional assets and liabilities disclosed at the bottom of the table in the 2014 annual report 
should not be viewed the same as the assets and liabilities presented at the top of the table. 
Additional examples in Appendix 2 – 6 provide alternative methods of presentation of the fair 
value hierarchy and the incorporation of IFRS 13. The small selection of alternative 
presentations provided in the appendix resulted in either errors or omissions from the databases 
used. As a result of the disclosure required under IFRS 13, information on the fair value 
hierarchy obtained from the S&P Capital IQ Fundamentals database included assets and 
liabilities carried at amortized cost, despite this not being disclosed by the database itself. The 
disclosure requirements, without standardization, resulted in numerous errors and misleading 
entries in the database, which compromised the integrity of the data and necessitated extreme 
levels of care, caution, and hand collection/verification. Rather than increase transparency, the 
disclosure requirements in IFRS 13 have arguably decreased it. This is compounded by the fact 
that many of the assets and liabilities carried at amortized cost, when classified into the fair value 
hierarchy, fall into the level 3 category. As a result, investors appear to be further discounting the 




 This study also highlights the importance of corporate governance mechanisms when 
investigating the fair value hierarchy. At the firm-level, corporate governance mechanisms have 
a strong effect and result in minimal differences in the value relevance of the different fair value 
levels. There is only a marginally significant difference between level 2 and level 3 assets, and 
no statistical difference between level 1 and level 2 or level 1 and level 3 assets. Country-level 
governance also has a strong effect and again results in all levels of the fair value hierarchy being 
value relevant. However, the effect does not appear to be as strong as the results for firm-level 
governance as there are statistically significant differences in the value relevance between all 
levels, even after considering the effect of country-level governance. The joint effect of firm- and 
country-level governance also has a strong effect on the value relevance of the fair value 
hierarchy with all levels being statistically significant and with no statistical differences between 
the different levels of the hierarchy. Firms with strong firm-level and strong country-level 
governance enhance value relevance in a similar manner across levels. An additional test, 
however, finds that there does not appear to be any additional benefit to having both strong firm-
level and strong country-level governance. That is, I find evidence that firm- and country-level 
governance act as substitutes for one another and investors view having either strong firm- or 
strong country-level governance to be sufficient to consider level 3 value relevant. This finding 
of firm- and country-level governance mechanisms acting as substitutes for one another supports 
results in Durnev and Kim (2005) and Ernstberger and Grüning (2013). 
 Overall, the results from this study should be of interest to standard setters, regulators, 
and boards of directors. From the perspective of standard setters, this study provides evidence 
that, despite the results of the post implementation review, there appear to be issues with the 
disclosures surrounding the fair value hierarchy. This finding is important as the goal of 
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increased transparency and comparability, which is particularly salient to level 3 fair values, does 
not appear to have been achieved. On the contrary, the lack of standardization in the disclosure 
practices appears to be exacerbating concerns surrounding level 3 fair values and additional 
clarifications in disclosure practices might be warranted to improve the decision usefulness of 
the fair value hierarchy.  
The results testing country-level governance, and specifically the sensitivity analysis 
using the Financial Freedom variable, provide insights on the importance of regulations in the 
banking sector. Specifically, limited government interference in the banking process, but 
maintaining regulations focused on enforcing contractual obligations and preventing fraud, are 
important elements to improve the decision usefulness of reported fair value information. 
Furthermore, the finding that strong country-level governance mechanisms can act as a substitute 
for firm-level corporate governance provides regulators with incentives to enact thoughtful 
regulations and improve the regulatory environment in a country.  
Finally, the results are of interest to boards of directors as they highlight the importance 
of firm-level governance in increasing the value relevance of fair values for their investors. 
Boards of directors for firms in countries with low country-level governance can take advantage 
of the substitutive nature of firm- and country-level governance to adopt strong firm-level 
corporate governance mechanisms. Strong firm-level governance leads to better and more 
informative disclosures, which enriches the information environment of a firm and leads to less 
concerns surrounding more opaque level 3 assets. The decreased concerns surrounding level 3 




Chapter 4 – The Fair Value Accounting Hierarchy as an Alternative Vehicle for Earnings 
Management and the Impact of Firm- and Country-Level Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms 
4.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I test whether the proportion of assets held at level 2 and level 3 of the fair 
value hierarchy, which are susceptible to managerial bias and/or manipulation, has an impact on 
the earnings management behaviour of banks. Moreover, I also investigate the impact that firm- 
and country-level corporate governance mechanisms have on this relationship. Despite one of the 
main concerns about the implementation of fair value accounting being its vulnerability to 
significant managerial influence, there is a significant gap in the literature investigating the 
potential for the fair value hierarchy to be used as an alternative earnings management tool 
(Benston, 2008; Penman, 2007, Watts, 2003).  
This study builds on the limited research available to improve our understanding of the 
potential role the fair value hierarchy plays in the earnings management behaviour of banks. 
Specifically, this study builds on and extends research conducted by Bratten, Causholli, and 
Myers (2017) and Xu (2019). I extend this research by separately investigating the two levels of 
the fair value hierarchy that are susceptible to managerial manipulation, and by investigating the 
ability of firm- and country-level corporate governance mechanisms to impact the relationship 
between two competing forms of earnings management. I find that the additional context 
provided by considering the effect of corporate governance mechanisms is necessary to reveal 
the relationship between the fair value hierarchy and the established practice of managing 
earnings through the loan loss provision. In the case of high governance, there is a negative 
association between the proportion of level 3 fair value assets and the discretionary component 
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of the loan loss provision, and this relationship is positive when governance is low. This 
relationship is consistent with managers believing that current governance mechanisms will be 
focused on curbing earnings management behaviour through the loan loss provision. As a result, 
managers appear to adjust their primary earnings management tool depending on the level of 
corporate governance. Moreover, results from additional analyses provide preliminary evidence 
to suggest that, in the context of earnings management, firm- and country-level governance 
mechanisms complement one another. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it contributes to the fair 
value accounting and earnings management literatures as it raises concerns that the fair value 
hierarchy appears to be a viable tool that managers can use to engage in earnings management. 
This result extends Bratten et al. (2017) by focusing on the fair value hierarchy, rather than a 
more general approach of measuring fair value exposure, and it extends Xu (2019) by 
investigating the individual levels of the hierarchy for which managers have the opportunity to 
manipulate the fair value estimates. Xu (2019) finds evidence for the combined proportion of 
level 2 and level 3 fair values having an impact on the level of discretionary loan loss provisions. 
However, the degree to which managers have the potential to manipulate these two levels varies 
considerably. The current study suggests that the source of the earnings management potential 
from the fair value hierarchy is primarily through level 3 fair values. 
Second, this study contributes to the corporate governance literature by investigating the 
effect of firm- and country-level governance in the face of two alternative forms of earnings 
management. The results suggest that considering the effect of corporate governance is integral 
to understanding the relationship between competing forms of earnings management. Also, the 
results suggest that managers believe that current corporate governance techniques are more 
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concerned with earnings management through the loan loss provision and less focused on 
attempts to manage earnings through the fair value hierarchy. Moreover, this study is, to the best 
of my knowledge, the first to provide preliminary evidence on the joint effect of firm- and 
country-level governance mechanisms on the relationship between two alternative forms of 
earnings management. 
Finally, this study has practical implications for standard setters and boards of directors. 
Standard setters should be concerned by the apparent use of the fair value hierarchy to engage in 
earnings management behaviour and that additional guidance and disclosures, especially 
pertaining to level 3 fair values, might be warranted. Boards of directors will be interested in the 
finding managers appear to use level 3 fair values to manage earnings specifically when 
corporate governance is high. Thus, this suggests that boards might need to expand their 
monitoring of managers to include the fair value hierarchy as a potential vehicle for earnings 
management. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 reviews relevant literature 
on income smoothing, earnings management and fair value accounting, and corporate 
governance and earnings management in banks. Section 4.3 develops the hypotheses and section 
4.4 presents the sample and model used to test the hypotheses. Section 4.5 presents the main 
results of the paper, section 4.6 presents an additional analysis, and section 4.7 details the 
robustness tests that have been performed. Finally, section 4.8 provides a discussion of the 




4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Income smoothing in the Banking Industry 
 The literature investigating income smoothing in the banking industry has a robust and 
substantial history dating back several decades (Greenawalt & Sinkey, 1988; Ma, 1988; 
Scheiner, 1981). However, the uniqueness of financial institutions typically leads to their almost 
systematic exclusion as an industry group from the mainstream earnings management literature 
(Bushman & Williams, 2012). As a result, despite a substantial history, the income smoothing 
literature focusing on financial institutions is lacking relative to the broader earnings 
management literature. The number of bank failures towards the end of the 1970s led, justifiably, 
to regulators and academics alike paying significant attention to the quality of bank earnings 
(Ma, 1988). Similarly, the recent global financial crisis shone a spotlight back on the banking 
industry, which has led to a significant increase in research in recent years (Cohen, Cornett, 
Marcus, & Tehranian, 2014). Aside from research focusing on the financial crisis and/or fair 
value accounting, the banking industry also provides a setting in which significant contributions 
to the already robust earnings management literature can be made (Lobo, 2017).  
Prior research in earnings management advances several reasons as to why managers 
prefer to manage, or smooth, their earnings (Collins, Shackelford, & Wahlen, 1995; Liu & Ryan, 
2006). Smoother earnings have been associated with improved access to external financing, 
lower risk premiums, and increased compensation for managers (Barth, Landsman, & Wahlen, 
1995; Ramanna & Watts, 2012; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978). The mechanism by which 
managers can smooth earnings is the discretion and flexibility afforded to them under accrual 
based accounting systems (Lobo, 2017). More specifically, the loan loss provision (LLP) is the 
largest and most salient accrual to financial institutions. As a result, the majority of prior 
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research focuses on this accrual, and often on the abnormal or discretionary element of this 
accrual, when evaluating the income smoothing of a bank (Beatty & Liao, 2014; Bhat, 1996; 
Bratten et al., 2017; Leventis, Dimitropoulos, & Anandarajan, 2011; Lobo, 2017; Ma, 1988). The 
LLP itself is a managerial estimate of the amount of loans that will be uncollectible in the future. 
The forward looking nature of this estimate relies on extensive judgement on the part of 
managers, which provides for ample opportunity for managerial discretion. As the LLP is an 
expense, management can use their discretion to overestimate (underestimate) this account, 
thereby decreasing (increasing) their income during particularly good (bad) periods of time 
(Lobo, 2017).  
Prior research investigating the use of the LLP to smooth earnings provides mixed 
evidence, but is generally supportive of the income smoothing hypothesis. (Ma, 1988) provides 
some of the earliest evidence that U.S. commercial banks use the LLP as a mechanism to smooth 
earnings. Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988) use a large sample of bank holding companies after the 
period in which a judgemental approach to calculating the LLP was implemented and find 
evidence of income smoothing. Similarly, Bhat (1996) also investigates the use of the LLP to 
smooth the earnings of a large sample of banks and finds evidence consistent with this 
hypothesis. Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Mathieu (2003) investigate alternative reasons for 
managers of banks to use the LLP to smooth earnings. More specifically, they document that 
concerns over their job security is a significant factor for managers when using the LLP to 
smooth earnings.  
A considerable number of other studies also document the use of the LLP to manage 
earnings in banks (Beatty, Ke, & Petroni, 2002; Chang, Shen, & Fang, 2008; Fonseca & 
González, 2008; Liu & Ryan, 2006). For a more detailed review of the substantial existing 
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earnings management literature on the banking industry, see reviews provided by Beatty and 
Liao (2014) and Lobo (2017). Although there is a substantial literature on earnings management 
and banking, there are some notable gaps in our current knowledge. More specifically, research 
investigating alternative earnings management tools is surprisingly limited, despite early 
identification that the use of one form of earnings management might depend on the use of 
another form (Beatty, Chamberlain, & Magliolo, 1995). The recent shift in accounting practices 
towards fair value, and the associated managerial discretion this shift provides, is potentially an 
alternative tool that managers can use to smooth earnings. A second area that is under researched 
is the effect that corporate governance mechanisms have on the earnings management behaviour 
of banks. I review the literature on the relationship of earnings management with fair value 
accounting and with corporate governance in the following two sections. 
4.2.2 Earnings Management and Fair Value Accounting 
 The literature investigating the intersection of fair value accounting and earnings 
management is less developed relative to the broader earnings management literature. Despite 
significant room for discretion afforded to managers through the use of level 2 and level 3 fair 
value models, the earnings management literature in banks still focuses primarily on the loan loss 
provision. This is likely due to a large focus being placed on income smoothing, which can be 
performed through discretion over an expense account, but which is not directly smoothed via 
discretion over an asset account. However, Dechow, Myers, and Shakespeare (2010) investigate 
how managers value the retained interest from securitizations, which is an asset account. The 
accounting rules for securitizations afford managers significant discretion over elements such as 
discount rates, default rates, and prepayment rates (Dechow et al., 2010). They interpret the 
discretion provided by the accounting rules as providing managers with the means to influence 
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the reported gains from securitization, thereby acting as a transaction-based earnings 
management tool.  
Mazza, Hunton, and McEwen (2011) suggest that accounting for level 3 assets falls into a 
category that Nelson, Elliott, and Tarpley (2002) refer to as imprecise standards. Moreover, 
Nelson et al. (2002) find that managers tend to attempt earnings management more under these 
types of imprecise standards, which highlights the importance of investigating what role, if any, 
the fair value hierarchy plays in the earnings management of banks. More recently, Bratten et al. 
(2017) and Xu (2019) more directly investigate the role that fair value accounting plays in the 
earnings management of banks. Using a sample of U.S. banks from 2000 – 2008, Bratten et al. 
(2017) investigate the extent to which overall exposure to fair value influences the use of the 
LLP to manage earnings. They find that the overall fair value exposure of a bank is negatively 
associated with the discretionary component of the LLP and is positively associated with the 
extent that banks trade off LLP-based and transaction-based earnings management techniques 
(Bratten et al., 2017). Xu (2019) also uses a U.S. sample to investigate the extent to which fair 
values influence the use of the LLP to manage earnings. Using a sample from 2009 – 2016, Xu 
(2019) is the first study that I am aware of to investigate the effect of the fair value hierarchy as 
an alternative earnings management mechanism. Xu (2019) finds that banks reporting a larger 
combined value of level 2 and level 3 assets have a lower discretionary component of the LLP. 
Taken together, the literature is starting to recognize the important role that fair value 
accounting has in acting as an alternative vehicle for earnings management. Understanding the 
extent of the role that fair value accounting plays in income smoothing is necessary to improve 
our overall understanding of the earnings management behaviour of banks. Moreover, 
understanding the different processes by which banks manage earnings is a necessary step to 
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evaluate the particular corporate governance mechanisms that will be effective in curbing this 
behaviour. 
4.2.3 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Banks 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, there is a rich literature on the role of corporate 
governance in curbing managerial bias, opportunism, and, by extension, earnings management 
behaviour. There is also a robust literature investigating the earnings management behaviour of 
banks, with a focus being on the loan loss provision. Despite these two substantial literatures, 
there is not a significant amount of overlap between these two important research streams 
(Leventis & Dimitropoulos, 2012). This is further evidenced by the general lack of mention in 
recent review papers provided by Beatty and Liao (2014) and Lobo (2017). This is particularly 
notable in Beatty and Liao (2014) as there are substantial sections devoted to separately 
reviewing the earnings management and the corporate governance literatures as they relate to the 
banking industry.  
 Even though the intersection of corporate governance and earnings management in 
banking is not a focus of recent reviews, there are studies that have jointly investigated these two 
important topics. Fonseca and González (2008) look at an international sample of banks covering 
the period of 1995 – 2002 and determine that banks in countries with stronger investor protection 
have lower levels of income smoothing. Furthermore, they also find that the extent of accounting 
disclosures is negatively related to the level of income smoothing (Fonseca & González, 2008). 
Similarly, Kanagaretnam, Lim, and Lobo (2014) also use an international sample of banks and 
find that, in the pre and during crisis period, banks in countries with stronger legal, extra-legal, 
and political systems have higher earnings quality and lower reported LLPs. Investigating a 
sample of U.S. banks from 1994 – 2002, Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian (2009) find evidence 
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that greater levels of board independence is negatively associated with earnings management 
behaviour. Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2012) investigate the effect of corporate governance on 
the earnings management behaviour for a sample of U.S. banks. Using an aggregate measure of 
corporate governance for a sample of banks over the period of 2003 – 2008, they find that banks 
with efficient corporate governance report fewer instances of small positive income, and engage 
in less aggressive earnings management practices than banks with weak governance (Leventis & 
Dimitropoulos, 2012). Finally, Miller, Minoiu, Wang, and Yang (2019) investigates the effect of 
institutional investors on the earnings management behaviour of banks. Using an international 
sample from 2001 – 2013, they find evidence that institutional ownership is negatively related to 
earnings management, and that this is especially true for banks in countries with weaker investor 
protection environments. 
While not directly an element of corporate governance, Kanagaretnam, Krishnan, and 
Lobo, (2010) and Kanagaretnam, Lim, and Lobo (2010) investigate the role of the auditor in 
curbing earnings management behaviour. Investigating a sample of U.S. banks from 2000 – 
2006, Kanagaretnam, Krishnan, et al. (2010) find that auditor independence, as proxied for by 
audit fees, is not related to earnings management for large banks, but that it is related to earnings 
management for small banks. Kanagaretnam, Lim, et al. (2010) investigate a sample of 
international banks and find that auditor type (Big 5 vs. non-Big 5) and auditor specialization 
help to curb earnings management behaviour. In further tests, it is determined that the results are 
primarily driven by the effect of auditor specialization (Kanagaretnam, Lim, et al., 2010). 
Similarly, Bratten et al. (2017) also find evidence that auditor industry specialization is 
associated with decreased LLP-based earnings management for a sample of U.S. banks. 
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Overall, both firm-level and country-level governance mechanisms appear to be effective 
in curbing the use of the LLP to smooth income. However, as mentioned in the previous section, 
the LLP is not the only method by which managers can engage in earnings management. I am 
not aware of any research in the banking literature that simultaneously investigates the effect of 
governance mechanisms in the face of an alternative form of earnings management. Addressing 
this gap in the literature is one of the main contributions of the current study. 
4.3 Hypothesis Development 
 Within the academic literature, the focus on the LLP as one of the main sources of 
earnings management in banks is well deserved. One of the unique factors about the banking 
industry is the level of regulatory attention and scrutiny to which it is subjected (Adams & 
Mehran, 2003; Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Levine, 2004). Regulators are aware of, and have 
taken steps to intervene, in the use of the LLP to manage earnings (Bratten et al., 2017). The 
creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 are two examples of interventions made in the banking industry 
with the intention of improving internal controls and financial reporting quality (Bratten et al., 
2017). Additionally, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the Government 
Accountability Office have also raised concerns and/or directly intervened with respect to the 
LLP of banks (Bratten et al., 2017; Liu & Ryan, 2006).  
Given the awareness and scrutiny of the LLP as an earnings management device, banks 
that still wish to smooth their income via this method are at a greater risk of enforcement actions. 
However, Beatty et al. (1995) find that the use of one form of earnings management in banks 
depends on the use, or availability, of another form. That is, because there is a substantial focus 
on the LLP as an earnings management tool, managers that are looking to smooth their income 
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might look to alternative earnings management tools available to them, in order to avoid 
additional scrutiny or potential enforcement actions. I argue that the discretion afforded to 
managers by level 2, and especially level 3, fair value measurements provide managers with such 
an alternative earnings management vehicle. Drawing on the judgement and decision-making 
literature, Martin, Rich, and Wilks (2006) discuss a number of ways in which management might 
intentionally or unintentionally introduce bias into the determination of the fair value 
measurements. The introduction of bias or manipulation of fair value measurements is supported 
by the value relevance literature that finds investors discount the value of reported level 2 and 
level 3 fair values (Siekkinen, 2017; Song, Thomas, & Yi, 2010).  
Bratten et al. (2017) presents early evidence that the greater the overall fair value 
exposure of U.S. banks is associated with a decreased discretionary component of the LLP. 
Similarly, Xu (2019) finds that the combined level 2 and level 3 fair value measurements of U.S. 
banks is also associated with a smaller discretionary LLP. Level 2 and level 3 fair value 
measurements are, however, quite different in their composition and in the level of discretion 
managers have in determining the final values. Moreover, findings from the banking industry in 
the U.S. are not necessarily reflective of banking industry practices in other countries. For 
instance, while SFAS 157 (now ASC 820) requiring the disclosure of the fair value hierarchy 
became effective in 2008 in the United States, its equivalent at the international level, IFRS 13, 
became effective only in 2013.15 While banks reporting under IFRS were able to learn from the 
U.S. experience, their own reporting was subject to much less guidance than U.S. banks between 
 
15 Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 157 – Fair Value Measurement, now replaced by Accounting 
Standard Code Topic 820, requires the disclosure of the fair value levels within the fair value hierarchy. At the 
international level, International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 7 on Financial Instruments Disclosure 
provides the foundation for the disclosure of the fair value hierarchy, but IFRS 13 (Fair Value Measurement) 
formalizes disclosure practices. Since IFRS 7 was not explicit on various measurement aspects, fair value hierarchy 
disclosure arising from its enactment is subject to some caveats, which IFRS 13 ha s resolved. 
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2007 and 2013. As such, which levels of the fair value hierarchy act as alternative earnings 
management tools and whether previous results are generalizable to countries outside of the U.S. 
remain as empirical questions. Thus, my first hypotheses, stated in the null, are: 
H1a: The proportion of level 2 fair value estimates is not associated with a banks’ use of 
the LLP to smooth earnings 
H1b: The proportion of level 3 fair value estimates is not associated with a banks’ use of 
the LLP to smooth earnings 
Corporate governance measures, at both the firm-level and the country-level, have been 
identified as being effective at curbing earnings management behaviour and increasing financial 
reporting quality (Bonetti, Magnan, & Parbonetti, 2016; Mechelli & Cimini, 2018; Siekkinen, 
2016, 2017; Song et al., 2010). Cornett et al. (2009) specifically investigate the independence of 
bank boards and find that a greater level of board independence is negatively associated with 
earnings management behaviour. In a similar vein, Siekkinen (2017) and Song et al. (2010) find 
that the independence of bank boards is positively related to the value relevance of level 3, but 
not level 1 or level 2, fair value assets. Greater value relevance associated with level 3 assets is 
indicative of investors believing that there has been less managerial manipulation or bias of the 
fair value estimate. The earnings management behaviour and value relevance of the fair value 
hierarchy has also been investigated from the perspective of a composite measure of corporate 
governance. Specifically, Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2012) find that a composite measure of 
firm-level governance is associated with less aggressive earnings management attempts and 
Song et al. (2010) find that a composite measure of corporate governance is positively associated 
with the value relevance of both level 2 and level 3 fair value assets. 
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In addition to the results at the firm-level, Fonseca and González (2008) and 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2014) find that stronger investor protection and stronger legal 
environments, respectively, lead to less income smoothing via the LLP. As it relates to fair value, 
Siekkinen (2016) finds that stronger investor protection environments lead to increased value 
relevance of both level 2 and level 3 fair value estimates. Mechelli and Cimini (2018), on the 
other hand, find that stronger legal systems are only associated with increased value relevance of 
level 2 fair value estimates. From the literature, it is clear that both firm-level and country-level 
corporate governance mechanisms are effective in curbing both earnings management and 
additional forms of managerial manipulation and bias. However, it is not clear how these systems 
would affect the trade-off between different earnings management tools. For example, corporate 
governance measures could be effective in acting individually on each tool such that a 
relationship no longer exists between the LLP and fair value estimates. Alternatively, governance 
measures may have a greater effect on curbing one form of earnings management, compared to 
an alternative, such that managers may opt to rely more on the alternative tool to smooth income. 
Thus, I formulate the following two hypotheses, presented in the null form: 
H2: Firm-level governance mechanisms will have no impact on the association between 
the use of fair value measurements and LLP to smooth income 
H3: Country-level governance mechanisms will have no impact on the association 




4.4 Data and Research Design 
4.4.1 Sample Selection 
 In order to test the proposed hypotheses, I focus on the financial services industries due to 
the significant levels of assets and liabilities reported at fair values on a recurring basis. My 
initial sample was identified by selecting all Canadian and European publicly traded companies 
in the financial services sector from within the screener tool provided by the SNL Financial 
“Companies” database and the S&P Capital IQ “Companies (Beta)” database. The period 
covered by this study is 2011 – 2017 and was selected for two primary reasons. First, because 
this study is covering an international sample of banks, it was important to ensure that IFRS had 
been adopted in each country in order to rule out the effect of different underlying accounting 
regimes. The majority of European countries adopted IFRS in 2005, but Canada did not adopt 
IFRS until 2011 (IFRS Foundation, 2017). Second, the global financial crisis had ended by 2011, 
with countries on the road to recovery. This allows for an investigation of earnings management 
practices and behaviours during periods of economic normalcy, while limiting the effect of 
extenuating circumstances. 
Table 9, Panel A details the sample selection process. The initial sample from the SNL 
Financial/S&P Capital IQ Fundamentals database consists of 3,241 firm-year observations from 
46 countries. In order to test the hypotheses, I require the banks to have necessary information to 
calculate discretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary realized securities gains and losses. 
I find that 989 firm-year observations do not have the required information to calculate the 
discretionary loan loss provision and an additional 71 firm-year observations are missing the 
information necessary to calculate the discretionary realized securities gains and losses. I further 
require information on the fair value accounting levels to be available in the databases, which 
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results in a loss of an additional 327 firm-year observations. Finally, complete firm-level 
governance information is missing for 987 observations. The final sample available to calculate 
the discretionary loan loss provision is 2,252 and the final sample to calculate the discretionary 
realized securities gains and losses is 2,181.16 The final sample available to test the proposed 
hypotheses is 867. See Table 9, Panel B for the distribution of observations by country, and 
Table 9, Panel C for the distribution of observations by year. 
[ Insert Table 9 About Here] 
4.4.2 Earnings Management Models 
 In order to estimate the discretionary components of both the loan loss provision and the 
realized securities gains and losses, I follow Beatty et al. (2002), Bratten et al. (2017) and Xu 
(2019) and take the residual from the following regression models: 17  
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 
              +𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡 
              +𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡 ( 1 ) 
 𝑅𝑆𝐺𝐿 𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑁𝐺𝐿 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡 
               +𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ( 2 ) 
For Equation (1), LLP is the loan loss provision scaled by average total gross loans outstanding 
during the year; LnTA is the natural logarithm of total assets; ΔNPL is the change in 
nonperforming loans scaled by average total gross loans; LLR is the loan loss reserve balance at 
 
16 Calculating the discretionary loan loss provision and discretionary realized securities gains and losses on a greater 
number of observations is consistent with (Xu, 2019). 
17 The discretionary realized gains and losses equation included here is for the purpose of calculating a pre-managed 
earnings variable to be included in my main hypothesis tests. 
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the beginning of the year scaled by the beginning total gross loans; and LoanRM, LoanCon, 
LoanCom, and LoanOth are, respectively, the proportions of residential mortgages, consumer 
loans, commercial loans, and other loans, each scaled by average total gross loans. The 
proportions of loan variables have been included because the ability of management to 
accurately estimate the loan loss provision might vary by loan type (Bratten et al., 2017).18 For 
Equation (2), RSGL is the realized securities gains and losses at the end of the year scaled by 
total assets at the beginning of the year, LnTA is as previously defined, and UNGL is the 
unrealized securities gains and losses at the beginning of the year scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of the year. 
4.4.3 Fair Value and Earnings Management Model 
 In order to investigate my first hypothesis and test the association between fair value 
measurements and the use of the LLP to manage earnings, I estimate the following regression 
equations, which are similar to Bratten et al. (2017) and Xu (2019): 
𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑃𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖 ,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑃𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
             +𝛽5𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑃𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡 
             +𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ( 3a ) 
𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑤_𝑃𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑤_𝑃𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
             +𝛽5𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑤_𝑃𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡 
             +𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ( 3b ) 
 
18 The loan types included differ from those included in either Bratten et al. (2017) or Xu (2019). This is due to the 
different samples used (U.S. vs. Canada/Europe) as well as labeling differences among databases. The variables I 
have included are the closest variables to which I had access. 
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where DLLP represents the discretionary component of the loan loss provision and is the residual 
from Equation (1); FVA2 is the fair value of assets carried at level 2 scaled by total assets; FVA3 
is the fair value of assets carried at level 3 scaled by total assets; High_PME is an indicator 
variable set to 1 when pre-managed earnings is in the top quintile of observations each year and 
0 otherwise; Low_PME is an indicator variables set to 1 when pre-managed earnings is in the 
bottom quintile of observations each year, and 0 otherwise; pre-managed earnings is defined as 
return on assets plus the discretionary loan loss provision less the discretionary realized 
securities gains and losses; and LnTA is as previously defined. 
I investigate my second and third hypotheses by splitting my sample on either firm- or 
country-level governance measures. More specifically, my second hypothesis is investigated by 
generating an indicator variable, GOV, to measure the strength of firm-level corporate 
governance. I split the sample based on firms that are considered to have high (1) or low (0) 
firm-level corporate governance and re-run equations (3a) and (3b). My third hypothesis is 
investigated by generating an indicator variable, RULE, to measure the strength of country-level 
corporate governance. As before, I split my sample based on firms residing in countries that are 
considered to have high (1) or low (0) country-level corporate governance and re-run equations 
(3a) and (3b). All regression models control for country and year fixed effects and all reports 
robust standard errors.19 
4.4.4 Financial Variables 
 The financial data for the sample firms is collected from multiple databases, including 
SNL Financial/S&P Capital IQ Fundamentals, Bloomberg, and FactSet. As this sample includes 
 
19 Alternative methods of calculating standard errors, including clustering by firm, clustering by count ry, and 
clustering by year a re also used. In all cases, and all regression specifications, there is not sufficient degrees of 
freedom to simultaneously test all the model coefficients after adjusting for the respective number of clusters. As a 
result, the model F-statistic is not reported for these tests. 
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firms from multiple countries that report in different currencies, the data has been obtained in 
USD in order to maintain a common currency throughout. The primary data source is SNL 
Financial/S&P Capital IQ, where it was obtained directly in USD. Data obtained from 
Bloomberg and FactSet was retrieved in the firms’ reported currency and was converted to USD 
using the exchange rate provided by SNL Financial/S&P Capital IQ.20 As the data was collected 
from multiple primary sources, it was necessary to prioritize the sources. The fair value level 
data from SNL Financial was given priority, which was followed by Bloomberg, and was 
additionally supplemented with hand collected/verified data. Fair value level information was not 
available from FactSet and the S&P Capital IQ Fundamentals data was deemed unreliable for the 
purposes of this study.21  
 The remaining financial variables are not expected to differ among the databases.22 As a 
result, except for the loan type variables, SNL Financial data was given priority, followed by 
S&P Capital IQ, and FactSet.23 For the loan type variables, FactSet was given priority over SNL 
Financial/S&P Capital IQ Fundamentals as the “types” most closely aligned with prior research.  
  
 
20 While the difference in exchange rates between SNL Financial/S&P Capital and Bloomberg or FactSet is minor, a  
common exchange rate is used to eliminate concerns of a difference in rates influencing the results. 
21 IFRS 13 became effective for annual periods beginning on or after January 1, 2013. This standard implemented 
new fair value disclosure requirements, resulting in many firms also disclosing the fair value hierarchy for assets and 
liabilities that are measured at amortized cost. The S&P Capital IQ Fundamentals database opted to disclose these 
values, if available, after this change in reporting standard. This resulted in significant inconsistencies in the fair 
value data for years 2013 – 2017 from the S&P Capital IQ Fundamentals database. For a more detailed discussion, 
refer to page 31 
22 Bloomberg was only used to obtain fair value level information and total assets. Loan loss provisions, 
nonperforming loans, loan loss reserve, loan type information, and realized and unrealized securities gains and 
losses was not originally obtained from Bloomberg and was subsequently unable to be collected due to the COVID-
19 pandemic 
23 S&P Capital IQ Fundamentals was given priority over Bloomberg or FactSet because  this negated the requirement 
of manually incorporating the exchange rate to convert the va lues to USD. 
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4.4.5 Firm- and Country-level Corporate Governance Variables 
The strength of firm-level governance is measured by combining five commonly used 
attributes of governance through factor analysis (Bonetti et al., 2016; Mechelli & Cimini, 2018; 
Siekkinen, 2017; Song et al., 2010). To the extent stronger performance on individual facets of 
corporate governance results in stronger firm-level governance as a whole, this method should 
better reflect the actual underlying strength of corporate governance than a single measure 
(Bonetti et al., 2016; R. Bushman, Chen, Engel, & Smith, 2004; DeFond, Hann, & Xuesong, 
2005). The firm-level governance data is collected from Bloomberg and the Datastream Asset4 
databases. The five governance attributes are: 1) board independence, measured as the number of 
independent directors divided by board size (INDEPENDENCE); 2) audit committee, 
represented as a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has an audit committee (AUDIT); 3) 
audit committee size (AC_SIZE); 4) audit committee independence, measured as the number of 
independent board members on the audit committee, divided by the size of the audit committee 
(AC_INDEPENDENCE); and 5) institutional ownership, represented as a dummy variable equal 
to one if the percentage of shares held by institutions is greater than 5% (INST_OWN). 
Table 10, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the firm- and country-level 
governance attributes. I then apply a principal component factor analysis on the five firm-level 
variables (Bonetti et al., 2016; Song et al., 2010). The first and primary factor exhibits the 
expected loadings, generating an eigenvalue of 1.946 and accounting for approximately 38.92% 
of the total variance in the original variables (Table 10, Panel B). The appropriateness of factor 
analysis was determined through a test of the intercorrelation between the governance variables. 
Using the Bartlett (1951) test of sphericity, the null hypothesis that the variables are not 
intercorrelated was rejected at the 1% level (p < 0.000). Based on Horn’s (1965) parallel 
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analysis, and a Monte Carlo extension by Glorfeld (2016), one factor was retained (Dinno, 
2018). Descriptive statistics for the GOVSCORE variable generated by the factor analysis are 
reported in Table 10, Panel C. Finally, I take the firm-specific mean of GOVSCORE across the 
sample years and create a binary variable (GOV) based on the sample median of the firm-
specific mean of GOVSCORE in order to create a time-invariant measure of the strength of firm-
level corporate governance (Bonetti et al., 2016).24 Firms with a score above (below) the sample 
median of the firm-specific mean of GOVSCORE are considered to have strong (weak) firm-
level corporate governance. The measure of country-level corporate governance, RULE, is a 
binary variable such that firms from countries with a Rule of Law (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2011) score above (below) the sample mean are considered to have strong (weak) 
country-level corporate governance. 
[Insert Table 10 About Here] 
4.5 Results 
 Table 11, Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
calculation of discretionary loan loss provision and discretionary realized securities gains and 
losses and Table 11, Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the main 
analyses. All continuous financial variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. On 
average, the loan loss provisions represent 1.4% of average total gross loans and realized 
securities gains and losses represent 0.1% of beginning total assets. Sample banks are large, with 
average assets at $115,000 million. Retaining only banks which are publicly traded explains this 
result. The mean change in nonperforming loans is -0.4% of average total gross loans and the 
 
24 As in (Bonetti et al., 2016), this method does “not assume that board monitoring intensity does not vary over time. 
Instead [it] assumes that cross-sectional differences in board monitoring intensity across firms [does] not” (p. 1069) 
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average reserve for loan losses is 5.7% of beginning total gross loans. The loan composition is 
distributed among the categories with residential mortgages, consumer loans, commercial loans, 
and other loans accounting for 17.8%, 22.4%, 27.9%, and 28.9% of average total gross loans, 
respectively. For the fair value measurements, assets held at level 2 account, on average, for 
9.3% of total assets and level 3 assets account, on average, for 0.9% of total assets.25 
 Table 11, Panel C contains the Pearson correlation coefficients. Discretionary loan loss 
provision is positively associated with total assets, and negatively associated with return on 
assets. Fair value level 2 is positively associated with total assets and fair value level 3 is 
negatively associated with return on assets. Neither level 2 nor level 3 fair value assets are 
significantly correlated with the discretionary loan loss provision, which provides some 
preliminary evidence against a rejection of the null hypotheses of no association between fair 
value accounting and discretionary loan loss provision, as outlined in H1a and H1b. This 
relationship will be investigated further in multivariate tests. 
[Insert Table 11 About Here] 
4.5.1 Multivariate Analyses 
 Table 12 contains the results from the estimation of the discretionary components of the 
loan loss provision and the realized securities gains and losses. Model 1 estimates the 
discretionary loan loss provision and has an adjusted R-square value of 24.1%. The coefficients 
on ΔNPL and LLR are 0.046 (p < 0.01) and 0.130 (p < 0.000), respectively. These results 
suggest that banks that increase their nonperforming loans during the year, or that have a higher 
proportion of loan loss reserves at the beginning of the year, are associated with higher loan loss 
 
25 Level 1 assets are not included in the model as these are not subject to managerial manipulation and, as such, are 
not theoretically expected to be associated with the use of the loan loss provision to manage earnings. 
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provisions. Loan loss provisions are also significantly associated with bank size and loan types. 
Bank size is negatively associated with loan loss provisions (-0.002, p < 0.001), and residential 
mortgages (-0.012, p < 0.01) and commercial loans (-0.007, p < 0.10) are also negatively 
associated with loan loss provisions. Other loans, which include interbank loans, is not 
significantly related to loan loss provisions, which is consistent with Bratten et al. (2017) and Xu 
(2019). Model 2 estimates the discretionary realized securities gains and losses and finds that, 
consistent with prior research, beginning unrealized securities gains and losses is positively 
associated (0.140, p < 0.10) with realized securities gains and losses (Bratten et al., 2017; Xu, 
2019).26 
[Insert Table 12 About Here] 
 Table 13 presents the regression analyses investigating the effect of fair value accounting 
on the use of the discretionary loan loss provision. Model 1 does not find any significant direct 
effect of either fair value level 2 or level 3 assets on the discretionary loan loss provision. Models 
2 and 3 expand model 1 by investigating if there is a different effect after considering the level of 
pre-managed earnings at a bank. In model 2, the coefficient on High_PME is negative and 
significant (-0.005, p < 0.10), but neither of the fair value levels, nor their interaction with 
High_PME are statistically significant. Finally, in model 3, the coefficient on fair value level 3 
assets is negative and significant (-0.071, p < 0.05) which suggests that banks with a higher 
proportion of fair value assets at level 3 exhibit a significantly lower level of discretionary loan 
loss provisions. Moreover, the coefficient for the interaction between Low_PME and level 3 
assets is positive and significant (0.669, p < 0.10), suggesting that banks with lower pre-managed 
earnings, relative to their peers, and a higher proportion of level 3 fair value assets exhibits 
 
26 Discretionary realized securities gains and losses is calculated in order to calculate the pre-managed earnings 
variable used in the main analyses. 
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higher discretionary loan loss provisions. Taken together, these results do not provide evidence 
that supports the rejection of H1a and offers mixed evidence to support rejecting H1b. That is, 
there does not appear to be evidence to support the claim that a greater proportion of level 2 fair 
value assets is associated with a banks’ use of the discretionary loan loss provision to smooth 
earnings. However, there does appear to be some evidence, at least is certain contexts, to support 
the notion that a greater proportion of level 3 fair value assets is associated with a banks’ use of 
the discretionary loan loss provision to smooth earnings. 
[Insert Table 13 About Here] 
 The results investigating the second hypothesis, which considers the impact of firm-level 
corporate governance on the association between fair value accounting and the loan loss 
provision to smooth income, are presented in Table 14. In addition to testing the impact of firm-
level corporate governance, these tests will also provide additional context to help interpret the 
results for H1a and H1b. The results for model 1 and model 2 of Table 14 investigate the direct 
effect of level 2 and level 3 assets, for firms with either high (GOV = 1) or low (GOV = 0) firm-
level governance. The results suggest that, when firm-level governance is high, having a higher 
proportion of assets at level 3 is negatively associated with discretionary loan loss provisions (-
0.125, p < 0.01), but there is no significant relationship when firm-level governance is low. 
Model 3 and model 4 include control variables for banks with high pre-managed earnings and 
provide similar results. Specifically, there is a significant negative relationship between the 
proportion of level 3 assets and discretionary loan loss provisions (-0.094, p < 0.000). Finally, 
model 5 and model 6 once again split the sample on high and low firm-level governance, but 
include control variables for banks with low pre-managed earnings. The results show a 
significant negative relationship between the proportion of level 3 fair value assets and the 
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discretionary loan loss provision (-0.128, p < 0.01) when firm-level governance is high. 
Moreover, model 6 shows a significant positive relationship between the proportion of level 3 
fair value assets and the discretionary loan loss provision (0.222, p < 0.05). The additional 
context that considers the effect of firm-level corporate governance provides additional evidence 
in support of rejecting H1b. Moreover, the significant result found in models 1 and 3, but not in 
models 2 and 4, and the switching of signs between model 5 and model 6, offers evidence that 
firm-level corporate governance has a significant effect on the relationship between level 3 fair 
value measurements and discretionary loan loss provisions. This evidence allows me to reject the 
null hypothesis, H2. 
[Insert Table 14 About Here] 
  The results investigating the third hypothesis, considering the impact of country-level 
governance on the association between fair value accounting and the loan loss provision to 
smooth income are presented in Table 15. As with the previous results, these tests also provide 
an additional context for interpreting the results for H1a and H1b. The results for model 1 and 
model 2 in Table 15 investigate the direct effect of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets, for firms 
in countries with either high (RULE = 1) or low (RULE = 0) country-level governance. The 
results suggest that when country-level governance is high, having a higher proportion of fair 
value level 3 assets is associated with less discretionary loan loss provisions (-0.108, p < 0.01). 
Additionally, for firms in countries with low country-level governance, there is a positive 
association between the proportion of level 3 assets and discretionary loan loss provisions 
(0.653, p < 0.10). Model 3 and model 4 in Table 15 include control variables for banks that have 
high pre-managed earnings. Once again, the results show a significantly negative association 
between the proportion of level 3 assets and discretionary loan loss provisions (-0.076, p < 
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0.000) when country-level governance is high, but a significantly positive association (0.723, p < 
0.10) when country-level governance is low. Finally, model 5 and model 6 in Table 15 includes 
control variables for banks that have low pre-managed earnings. As before, when country-level 
governance is high, the proportion of level 3 assets is significantly negatively associated with the 
level of discretionary loan loss provisions (-0.120, p < 0.01) but significantly positively 
associated (0.158, p < 0.05) when country-level governance is low.  
In addition to the significant direct results for level 3 fair values, there is also a significant 
positive effect on the interaction between the proportion of level 3 fair values and  having low 
pre-managed earnings. When country-level governance is high, the coefficient on this interaction 
is 0.194 (p < 0.10) and is 1.001 (p < 0.10) when country-level governance is low. Despite the 
apparent difference in magnitude between the coefficients, a seemingly unrelated estimation test 
was performed to test the cross-model difference. Using a chi-square test with 1 degree of 
freedom, the result of this test determined that the coefficients on the interaction between level 3 
fair values and low pre-managed earnings from model 5 and model 6 are not statistically 
different from one another (χ2 = 2.36, p = 0.12).27 Considering the effect of country-level 
governance offers an important context with which to interpret the hypotheses and offers 
additional support for rejecting the null hypothesis, H1b. Moreover, the switching of signs on the 
coefficient for the proportion of level 3 assets, depending on the level of country-level 
governance, offers evidence that country-level governance has a significant effect on the 
relationship between the proportion of level 3 fair values and the discretionary loan loss 
provisions. This evidence allows me to reject the null hypothesis, H3. 
[Insert Table 15 About Here] 
 
27 A seemingly unrelated estimation test performed with standard errors clustered by firm does result in a significant 
difference between the two coefficients, χ2(1) = 4.15, p < 0.05 
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4.6 Joint Governance – Preliminary Analysis 
 The results for the main hypotheses offer strong support for the individual effects of 
either firm-level or country-level governance on the relationship between the proportion of level 
3 fair value assets and the discretionary loan loss provisions of a bank. However, there is also 
literature showing the importance of investigating the joint effect of firm- and country-level 
governance (Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009; Bonetti et al., 2016; Bruno & Claessens, 2010; Chen, 
Chen, & Wei, 2009; Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2007; Durnev & Kim, 2005; Ernstberger & 
Grüning, 2013). In order to test the joint effect of firm- and country-level governance, I use an 
approach similar to testing hypotheses 2 and 3. Specifically, I split the sample based on the 
combinations of high/low firm-level governance and high/low country-level governance and re-
estimate equations (3a) and (3b). The GOV and RULE variables are as previously defined and 
the distribution of observations into the firm- and country-level governance pairs are presented in 
Table 16. Splitting the sample in such a manner has a significant effect on the number of 
observations available to estimate each regression, so all results in this additional analysis, while 
informative, should be interpreted with caution. 
[Insert Table 16 About Here] 
 The results testing the joint effect of firm- and country-level governance are presented in 
Table 17. Models 1 – 4 investigate the direct effect of the proportion of level 2 and level 3 fair 
value assets, models 5 – 8 include control variables for banks with high pre-managed earnings, 
and models 9 – 12 include control variables for low pre-managed earnings. Each set of 
regressions represent a combination of either high (G1) or low (G0) firm-level governance and 
high (R1) or low (R0) country-level governance. The results for models 1 – 4 suggest that there 
is a significant negative relationship for the proportion of level 3 assets (-0.134, p < 0.01) when 
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both firm- and country-level governance are high, but a significant positive relationship when 
both firm- and country-level governance are low (0.737, p < 0.10). There is no significant 
relationship when only one of the governance mechanisms is high and the other is low.  
Models 5 – 8 provide results consistent with models 1 – 4. When both firm- and country-
level governance are high, there is a significant negative relationship between the proportion of 
level 3 fair value assets and the discretionary loan loss provisions (-0.093, p < 0.000), but a 
significant positive relationship when both firm- and country-level governance are low (0.785, p 
< 0.10). In addition to these results, there is also a significant relationship for the interaction 
between banks with high pre-managed earnings and the proportion of assets held at level 2. 
Specifically, the coefficient on the interaction between the proportion of assets held at level 2 
and high pre-managed earnings is positive and significant (0.100, p < 0.01) when firm-level 
governance is high but country-level governance is low (model 6), but negative and significant (-
0.070, p < 0.01) when firm-level governance is low but country-level governance is high (model 
7).  
Models 9 – 12 also provide generally consistent results. When both firm- and country-
level governance are high, there is a significant negative relationship between the proportion of 
level 3 fair value assets and the discretionary loan loss provisions (-0.141, p < 0.01), but a 
significant positive relationship when both firm- and country-level governance are low (0.183, p 
< 0.05). There is also a significant positive relationship between the proportion of level 3 assets 
and discretionary loan loss provisions (0.137, p < 0.10) when firm-level governance is low, but 
country-level governance is high (model 11). In addition to the significant direct effects, there 
are also significant relationships observed when the fair value levels are interacted with banks 
having low pre-managed earnings. The interaction between the proportion of level 2 assets and 
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low pre-managed earnings is significant and negative when either firm- or country-level 
governance, but not both, is high (model 10: -0.067, p < 0.10; model 11: -0.036, p < 0.05). There 
is also a significant negative coefficient on the interaction of the proportion of level 3 assets and 
low pre-managed earnings when firm-level governance is low, but country-level governance is 
high (-0.195, p < 0.10). Finally, when both firm- and country-level governance is low, there is a 
significant positive relationship between the interaction between the proportion of level 2 assets 
and low pre-managed earnings (0.263, p < 0.05) and the interaction between the proportion of 
level 3 assets and low pre-managed earnings (0.997, p < 0.10).  
[Insert Table 17 About Here] 
Taken together, the results suggest the firm- and country-level governance mechanism 
primarily act as complements to one another. When both elements of governance are either 
present or absent, there is a significant effect on the relationship between the proportion of level 
3 fair value assets and the level of discretionary loan loss provisions. However, when only one of 
the governance elements is present, there typically is no effect on the relationship, except for a 
weakly positive effect in model 11. As mentioned previously, these results should be interpreted 
with caution due to the limited sample sizes, but the results are generally consistent with the 
main analyses. Specifically, in the proper context, there appears to be evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis of no relationship between the proportion of level 3 assets and the discretionary loan 
loss provisions (H1b). Moreover, the differing effects, including the switching of signs, suggests 
that both firm- and country-level governance complement one another in their impact on the 





4.7 Additional Analyses 
 To assess the robustness of my main results, I re-estimate each model using alternative 
variable specifications. First, I exclude the country fixed effects from regression models that are 
split by country. The overall interpretation of the results untabulated is similar, but there are 
some differences, primarily related to the level 2 fair values. When just country-level governance 
is considered, fair value level 2 becomes positive and significant in model 1, model 3, and model 
5 (p < 0.01; p < 0.05; p < 0.01), but fair value level 3 is not significant in model 2 and model 6. 
When the joint effect of firm- and country-level governance is considered, fair value level 2 
becomes positive and significant in model 3 and models 9 – 11, fair value level 3 becomes 
positive and significant in model 6 and model 7, but fair value level 3 in model 4, model 8, and 
models 11 – 12 is no longer significant. The interaction between fair value level 2 and high pre-
managed earnings in model 7 is no longer significant and the interaction between level 2 and low 
pre-managed earnings in model 11 is also no longer significant. Finally, the positive coefficient 
on the interaction between fair value level 3 and low pre-managed earnings becomes significant 
in model 9 (p < 0.10), but is no longer significant in model 11. 
Second, Xu (2019) includes a lagged discretionary loan loss provision variable as an 
additional predictor variable. Untabulated tests are largely consistent with the main results, with 
some minor differences. Without considering any form of governance, level 3 fair values, and 
the coefficient on the interaction between level 3 and low pre-managed earnings, is no longer 
significant in model 3. When considering only firm-level governance, the positive coefficient on 
level 3 fair value assets becomes significant in model 2 (p < 0.10) and the negative coefficient on 
the interaction between level 2 fair values and low pre-managed earnings becomes significant in 
model 5 (p < 0.10). When considering only country-level governance, the coefficient on fair 
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value level 3 in model 4 is no longer significant. The coefficient on the interaction between fair 
value level 3 and low pre-managed earnings is also no longer significant in model 5 and model 6, 
whereas the coefficient on fair value level 2 and low pre-managed earnings is negative and 
significant in model 5 (p < 0.10) and positive and significant in model 6 (p < 0.10). However, it 
should be noted that there are not sufficient degrees of freedom to simultaneously estimate all of 
the coefficients in model 1, model 3, or model 5. When considering the joint effect of firm- and 
country-level governance, the coefficient on the interaction between level 3 fair values and high 
pre-managed earnings is negative and significant in model 7 (p < 0.05), but the coefficient on 
level 3 fair values in model 8 is no longer significant. The coefficient on level 3 fair values is 
positive and significant in model 10 (p < 0.05), but is no longer significant in model 11. The 
coefficients on the interaction between fair value level 2 and low pre-managed earnings is no 
longer significant in model 10 or model 11, and the coefficient on the interaction between fair 
value level 3 and low pre-managed earnings is negative and significant in model 10, but is no 
longer significant in model 11 or model 12. However, it should again be noted that there are not 
sufficient degrees of freedom to simultaneously estimate all of the coefficients in model 3, model 
7, and model 11. 
Third, rather than use continuous variables for level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and the 
respective interactions, I split each level at the median for the year and classify values above 
(below) the median as having high (low) levels of fair value assets. I then compute the 
interaction terms using the binary fair value data. The use of continuous data for the direct effect 
of fair values and binary level data for fair value interaction terms is consistent with the main 
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analyses (Xu, 2019).28 Untabulated results are generally consistent with my main results, with a 
few minor differences. Without considering any form of corporate governance, the negative 
coefficient on level 3 fair values and the positive coefficient on the interaction between level 3 
and low pre-managed earnings are no longer significant in model 3. Considering only firm-level 
governance, the positive coefficient for level 3 fair value assets in model 6 is no longer 
significant.29 Considering only the effect of country-level governance, the negative coefficient on 
the interaction between level 3 fair values and low pre-managed earnings is no longer significant 
in either model 5 or model 6. Finally, when considering the joint effect of firm- and country-
level governance, the significant coefficients on the interaction between level 2 fair values and 
low pre-managed earnings in models 10 – 12 are not significant, the coefficient on the interaction 
between level 3 fair values and low pre-managed earnings is model 11 and model 12 is not 
significant, but the positive coefficient on this interaction in model 9 becomes significant (p < 
0.05).30 
 A second alternative specification for the fair value levels is to split each level into 
quintiles by year and classify values in the top quintile as having high levels of fair values, with 
all other values being considered to have low levels of fair values. I then use the binary fair value 
level variables to compute the interaction terms.31 Untabulated results are largely consistent with 
my main results, with a few exceptions. Without considering the effect of governance, the 
negative coefficient on level 3 fair value assets and the positive coefficient on the interaction 
 
28 A robustness test using binary data, split at the median, for both the direct effect of fair value levels and for the 
interaction terms is also performed and the results are similar. 
29 The positive coefficient on level 3 fair values in model 2, model 4, and model 6 is significant (p < 0.05; p < 0.05; 
p < 0.01) when binary fair value levels are used for the direct effect. 
30 The use of indicator variables, rather than continuous variables, for level 2 and level 3 fair va lues resulted in the 
interaction between level 3 fair values and high pre-managed earnings to be omitted due to collinearity in model 7 of 
the joint test of firm- and country-level governance. 
31 A robustness test using binary data, split at the top quintile, for both the direct effect of fair value levels and for 
the interactions terms is also performed and the results are similar. 
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between level 3 fair value assets and low pre-managed earnings is no longer significant. 
Considering only the effect of firm-level governance, the fair value level 2 interaction with high 
pre-managed earnings coefficient is omitted from model 3 due to collinearity. Considering only 
the effect of country-level governance, neither the positive coefficient on fair value level 3 nor 
the positive coefficient on the interaction between fair value level 3 and low pre-managed 
earnings is significant in model 6, but the positive coefficient on the interaction between fair 
value level 2 and low pre-managed earnings is significant (p < 0.01) in model 6. Finally, when 
considering the joint effect of firm- and country-level governance, the information lost through 
dichotomization, coupled with the small sample size, results in interaction terms being omitted 
from models 5 – 7 and model 10 due to collinearity. Moreover, there is not enough degrees of 
freedom to simultaneously test all variables in model 12. Thus, while the results of the remaining 
variables of interest are generally consistent with the main results, a direct comparison to the 
main results is inappropriate.32 
 In addition to using alternative specifications for the fair value levels, I test an alternative 
cut-off for the pre-managed earnings variable. Specifically, I split pre-managed earnings at the 
median each year and classify firms with a value above (below) the median as having high (low) 
pre-managed earnings. Untabulated results are again generally consistent with the main results 
with a few exceptions. Without considering any form of governance, the interaction on fair value 
level 3 and low pre-managed earnings is no longer significant. When just country-level 
governance is considered, the coefficient on fair value level 3 in model 3 and model 4 is no 
longer significant, but maintains the same sign, and the coefficient on the interaction between 
 
32 Using binary variables, based on the top quintile, for the direct effect of the fair value levels and the interaction 
terms compounds this issue such that, when considering the joint effect of firm - and country-level governance, the 
direct effect of fair value level 2 is omitted from model 2, model 6, and model 10 due to collinearity.  
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level 3 fair value and low pre-managed earnings is no longer significant for model 6. When 
considering the joint effect of firm- and country-level governance, the positive coefficient on 
level 3 in model 8 and model 11 is no longer significant, the coefficient on the interaction 
between level 2 fair value and low pre-managed earnings is positive and significant in model 11 
but is not significant in model 12, and the coefficient on the interaction between level 3 and low 
pre-managed earnings in model 11 and model 12 is not significant. Finally, the coefficient on fair 
value level 2 is positive and significant in model 10 (p < 0.01) and negative and significant in 
model 11 (p < 0.05). 
 I also test an alternative country-level governance variable. Specifically, I use the 
Financial Freedom attribute from the Index of Economic Freedom provided by The Heritage 
Foundation. Rather than look at the rule of law dimension of a country, financial freedom looks 
at banking efficiency and the extent of regulations of financial services within a country. A 
binary country-level governance variable is created such that countries scoring above (below) the 
mean are considered to have strong (weak) country-level governance. Untabulated results using a 
country-level governance variable representing regulations are largely consistent with the main 
results. When considering only country-level governance, the coefficient on fair value level 3 in 
model 2, and model 4, while still positive, is no longer significant, and the coefficient on the 
interaction between level 3 and low pre-managed earnings is no longer significant in model 6. 
When considering the joint effect of firm- and country-level governance the negative coefficient 
on fair value level 2 and the positive coefficient level 3 become significant in model 3 (both p < 
0.01), but the coefficient on fair value level 3 in model 4 is no longer significant. There is a 
positive significant coefficient on fair value level 2 in model 6 (p < 0.05) and the negative 
coefficient on fair value level 2 and positive coefficient on fair value level 3 become significant 
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in model 7 (p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively). The coefficient on the interaction between level 
2 and high pre-managed earnings in model 7 and the coefficient on fair value level 3 in model 8 
are no longer significant. The coefficient on fair value level 2 is positive and significant (p < 
0.01) in model 10 and negative and significant (p < 0.01) in model 11. Finally, the coefficient on 
the interaction between fair value level 2 and low pre-managed earnings in model 11 and the 
coefficient on fair value level 3 and low pre-managed earnings in model 12 are no longer 
significant. 
4.8 Discussion 
 This chapter investigates the potential for the fair value hierarchy, specifically the levels 
subject to managerial discretion, to be used as an alternative vehicle for earnings management in 
banks and the impact, if any, of firm- and country-level governance on this potential. Across all 
of my main analyses, I find no evidence of a direct effect of the proportion of level 2 fair value 
assets influencing the level of discretionary loan loss provisions of a bank. Absent from the 
influence of either firm- or country-level governance, I find evidence of a direct negative effect 
for level 3 fair values on the use of the discretionary loan loss provision in banks when 
controlling for banks having low pre-managed earnings. However, accounting for either firm- or 
country-level governance provides important context with which to interpret the results.  
Splitting the sample into firms with high or low firm-level corporate governance results 
in a consistently significant negative relationship between the proportion of fair value assets held 
at level 3 and the level of discretionary loan loss provision when firm-level governance is high. 
Moreover, the sign on the proportion of level 3 fair value assets is consistently positive when 
firm-level governance is low, although it is only significant after controlling for banks with low 
pre-managed earnings. I interpret this result as managers of a firm being aware of the monitoring 
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role of firm-level governance and altering their earnings management behaviour in a way that is 
dependent on this monitoring. Specifically, the primary method by which banks manage earnings 
is through discretionary loan loss provisions, so managers in a firm with a high degree of 
monitoring expect that governance mechanisms in place will focus the discretionary loan loss 
provision. Thus, in an effort to avoid detection of earnings management behaviour, managers 
will decrease the use of the loan loss provision and will instead try to manage earnings via 
alternate means, such as level 3 fair values. 
The results for splitting the sample into firm originating in countries with high or low 
country-level governance provides results consistent with the results found when splitting the 
sample on firm-level governance. There is consistently a significant negative relationship 
between the proportion of level 3 fair values and the level of discretionary loan loss provisions 
when country-level governance is high. Moreover, in the case of country-level governance, there 
is a consistently positive and significant relationship between the proportion of level 3 fair value 
assets and the level of discretionary loan loss provisions when country-level governance is low. 
This result is consistent with managers believing that current forms of governance will focus on 
curtailing managerial discretion pertaining to the loan loss provision, but that perhaps do not 
currently view earnings management through the fair value hierarchy as a primary concern. 
When governance is low, managers appear to focus on the already established process of using 
their discretion in the loan loss provision to manage earnings. I interpret this result to suggest 
that managing earnings through the fair value hierarchy is more costly for managers than using 
the loan loss provision and that managers recognize this cost and limit their use of this form of 
earnings management to situations where scrutiny of the loan loss provision is high. 
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Finally, the results from the additional analysis of splitting the sample into groups based 
on joint firm- and country-level governance should be interpreted with caution, but are 
nevertheless consistent with the main analyses. There is consistently a significant negative 
relationship between the proportion of level 3 fair value assets and the level of discretionary loan 
loss provisions when both firm- and country-level governance is high, and a consistently 
significant positive relationship when both firm- and country-level governance is low. However, 
if either firm- or country-level governance is high and the other is low, there is no significant 
relationship between the proportion of level 3 fair value assets and the level of discretionary loan 
loss provisions except when controlling for low pre-managed earnings in countries with low 
firm- but high country-level governance. This result provides preliminary evidence that, as it 
relates to the potential for the fair value hierarchy to act as an alternative vehicle for earnings 
management, firm- and country-level governance act as complements to one another. 
Overall, the results from this study should be of interest to standard setters and boards of 
directors. From the perspective of standard setters, the results of this study provide evidence that 
the discretion afforded to managers in the fair value hierarchy may be used to manage earnings. 
This is particularly important because managers appear to be using the fair value hierarchy to 
manage earnings specifically when firm- and country-level governance is high. This suggests 
that managers do not believe current corporate governance practices are focused on or equipped 
to detect earnings management through the fair value hierarchy. Despite the recent post-
implementation review suggesting that IFRS 13 is complete and does not require further work 
(IFRS Foundation, 2018), this result suggests adjustments to the standard, including expanded 
disclosures for level 3 fair values might be warranted. 
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From the perspective of the board of directors, the results of this study suggest a need to 
expand their monitoring of managers to include the fair value hierarchy as a possible tool for 
earnings management. Specifically, managers appear to consider their governance environment, 
from both a firm- and country-level perspective, and take this into account when making 
earnings management decisions. Moreover, the shift in behaviour towards less reliance on 
discretionary loan loss provisions when governance is high implies that managers believe that 
efforts to curb earnings management will be focused primarily on the loan loss provision. This 
focus on the loan loss provision leaves managers with relatively greater freedom to manage 




Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
 Overall, the purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the interface between both firm- 
and country-level corporate governance mechanisms and the fair value accounting hierarchy for 
a sample of international banks in the post-financial crisis period. In the first paper I investigate 
the value relevance of the fair value hierarchy and the impact that firm- and country-level 
governance has on the value relevance of the hierarchy. I find that, contrary to prior research, 
investors do not find level 3 fair values to be sufficiently reliable to be used in the valuation of a 
firm, absent the consideration of some form of corporate governance. Moreover, I find evidence 
that not only supports the importance of individually considering firm- or country-level 
governance, I find evidence that contributes to the joint firm- and country-level governance 
literature. Specifically, I find that, in the case of value relevance of the fair value hierarchy, firm- 
and country-level governance mechanisms act as substitutes for one another. 
 In the second paper, I investigate the potential for the fair value hierarchy to be used as an 
alternative vehicle to manage earnings and the impact that firm- and country-level governance 
might have on the usage of this alternative earnings management method. First, without 
considering the effect of governance, I find only moderate support for the notion that the fair 
value hierarchy acts as an alternative earnings management tool. However, splitting the sample 
to consider the effect of either firm- or country-level governance reveals the underlying 
relationship. Specifically, level 2 fair values, except under one robustness test, do not appear to 
be a viable alternative earnings management method that managers are currently using, but level 
3 fair values do appear to be a viable alternative earnings management tool. When either firm- or 
country-level governance is high, firms with a higher proportion of level 3 fair values is 
associated with lower levels of discretionary loan loss provisions. Alternatively, when firm- or 
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country-level governance is low, a higher proportion of level 3 fair values is associated with 
higher levels of discretionary loan loss provisions. This result is consistent with managers 
believing that current governance mechanisms will be focused on established earnings 
management practices and not focused on alternative means, such as the fair value hierarchy. 
This result also suggests that managers alter their use of earnings management techniques 
depending on their specific governance environment. Moreover, the additional analysis suggests 
that, in the context of earnings management, firm- and country-level governance mechanisms act 
as complements to one another. 
 Taken together, the results of these two studies suggest that, contrary to the conclusion in 
the post-implementation review of IFRS 13, there is room for improvement in areas relating to 
the disclosure requirements for level 3 values and for the fair value hierarchy in general. The 
standard would benefit from additional guidance to increase the transparency of level 3 values, 
and additional guidance on presentation standards to enhance comparability. Furthermore, the 
results of this dissertation underscore the importance of context in general, and in fair value 
accounting research specifically. Especially from the perspective of the second study, without the 
additional context of considering governance, the conclusion drawn would have been that the fair 
value hierarchy does not act as an alternative vehicle for earnings management. However, the 
additional context provided by considering governance revealed the underlying relationship that 
would have otherwise remained hidden. Considering different forms of corporate governance 
when studying fair value accounting is important. Moreover, it is integral for analyses involving 
a cross-country sample to consider how these two different levels of governance interact with 
one another.  
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 The results of this dissertation provide evidence on the importance of firm- and country-
level governance when investigating the fair value hierarchy. These results suggest that future 
research could focus on additional implementation concerns arising from IFRS 13 to develop 
concrete suggestions to improve fair value disclosures. This dissertation also provides some 
preliminary evidence on the possibility of the fair value hierarchy to be used as an alternative 
vehicle for earnings management, but future studies could address this further in alternative 
samples and with alternative forms of governance. The current studies focused only on public 
banks, but there is a large literature investigating alternative forms of bank ownership structures, 
such as co-operatives or credit unions. These banks operate in the same market as public banks, 
but have very different governance structures. As such, it is unclear if the inferences applicable 
to fair value and governance are generalizable and research investigating this relationship would 
be valuable.  
 This dissertation is also subject to limitations. First, the sample sizes are relatively small, 
which is primarily due to the lack of available firm-level governance data. Second, data breaking 
down the fair value hierarchy is difficult to come by and, as a result of IFRS 13 and depending 
on the source database, is subject to concerns for observations related to annual periods 
beginning on or after January 1, 2013. Every attempt was made within this dissertation to 
identify and hand collect/verify observations that appeared to suffer integrity concerns. However, 
to the extent that any observations were not identified, the results should be interpreted with 
caution. Third, as these studies use an international sample of banks that report in multiple 
currencies, a common base currency (USD) was used for all observations. To the extent that 
exchange rate fluctuations might alter the underlying relationships, the results should be 
interpreted with caution. However, it was determined that concerns surrounding exchange rate 
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fluctuations were less of a concern than not using a common base currency for all observations. 
Finally, for the second paper, it could be argued that the loan loss provision and level 3 fair 
values are jointly determined by an omitted variable. This concern is largely addressed through 
the analyses concentrating on corporate governance, and the inclusion of extensive fixed effects, 
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Panel A: Sample Selection 
Listed financial institutions in Canada and Europe from SNL Financial/S&P Capital IQ 
Fundamentals database 
3,241 
     Less: Missing share price information 559 
     Less: Missing fair value hierarchy information 686 
     Less: Missing firm-level corporate governance information 1,064 
     Less: Extreme share price values 34 
     Less: Outliers 27 
Final sample 871 
  
Panel B: Distribution of Sample by Country  
Country Name   Freq.     % Country Name   Freq.    % Country Name   Freq.     % 
Austria 14 1.61 Germany 24 2.76 Portugal 17 1.95 
Belgium 17 1.95 Greece 22 2.53 Romania 14 1.61 
Canada 93 10.68 Hungary 14 1.61 Russia 28 3.22 
Croatia 13 1.49 Ireland 21 2.41 Slovakia 3 0.34 
Cyprus 5 0.57 Italy 84 9.64 Spain 48 5.51 
Czech Republic 9 1.03 Kazakhstan 14 1.61 Sweden 35 4.02 
Denmark 21 2.41 Malta 7 0.80 Switzerland 35 4.02 
Finland 7 0.80 Netherlands 17 1.95 Turkey 77 8.84 
France 33 3.79 Norway 26 2.99 United Kingdom 99 11.37 
Georgia 2 0.23 Poland 72 8.27    
         
Panel C: Distribution of Sample by Year   
Year Freq. % 
2011 118 13.55 
2012 120 13.78 
2013 117 13.43 
2014 124 14.24 
2015 130 14.93 
2016 132 15.15 






Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Governance Variables 
   N Mean St.Dev min max p25 Median p75 
Firm-level         
  INDEPENDENCE 871 0.556 0.261 0 1 0.333 0.563 0.762 
  AUDIT 871 0.972 0.164 0 1 1 1 1 
  AC_SIZE 871 3.923 1.601 0 14 3 4 5 
  AC_INDEPENDENCE 871 0.783 0.305 0 1 0.625 1 1 
  INST_OWN 871 0.944 0.231 0 1 1 1 1 
         
Country-level         
  Rule of Law 871 1.091 0.801 -0.818 2.1 0.403 1.413 1.805 
 
Panel B: Governance Factor Score 
Variable  Factor Loading 
Coefficients 
 INDEPENDENCE 0.671 
 AUDIT 0.669 
 AC_SIZE 0.701 
 AC_INDEPENDENCE 0.786 
 INST_OWN 0.142 
  
Variation Explained 40.56% 
Eigenvalue 2.028 
  
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity  
     Chi-Square 753.349 
     Degrees of Freedom 10 
     p-value 0.000 
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics of the Firm-Level Governance Factor Score 
   N Mean St.Dev min max p25 Median p75 
 GOVSCORE 871 0 1 -4.795 2.280 -0.426 0.148 0.582 
 













304 100 404  
35% 12%   
HIGH 
(1) 
126 341 467  
14% 39%   




Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis Tests 
     N   Mean   St.Dev   min   max   p25   Median   p75 
 BV 871 -30.782 378.126 -7480.734 4569.342 -21.839 -2.687 0.577 
 NI 871 -8.054 121.565 -2973.593 92.843 0.083 0.542 1.860 
 FVA1 871 89.294 639.075 0.000 10659.755 1.944 11.224 39.361 
 FVA2 871 117.214 1023.396 0.000 25380.789 0.320 5.208 45.131 
 FVA3 871 18.040 320.339 0.000 8092.128 0.022 0.374 2.464 
 FVL12 871 146.869 1307.820 0.000 26491.557 0.125 3.569 41.239 
 FVL3 871 16.793 375.403 0.000 10779.590 0.000 0.000 0.307 
 SP4 871 21.428 45.859 0.139 902.797 3.373 9.631 28.239 
 
Panel B: Correlation Coefficients 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  (1) SP4 1.000 
  (2) BV -0.072* 1.000 
  (3) FVA1 0.656* -0.169* 1.000 
  (4) FVA2 0.347* -0.386* 0.696* 1.000 
  (5) FVA3 0.042 -0.242* 0.497* 0.925* 1.000 
  (6) FVL12 0.499* -0.261* 0.842* 0.965* 0.843* 1.000 
  (7) FVL3 0.013 0.277* 0.603* 0.574* 0.701* 0.628* 1.000 
  (8) NI -0.550* 0.659* -0.711* -0.460* -0.168* -0.531* -0.023 1.000 
         






Value Relevance of Fair Values 
Independent variables  Coef. Robust SE t-value p-value 
 BV β1 0.216 0.035 6.22 0.000*** 
 NI β2 0.031 0.043 0.72 0.472 
 FVA1 β3 0.303 0.043 7.01 0.000*** 
 FVA2 β4 0.304 0.046 6.61 0.000*** 
 FVA3 β5 0.075 0.052 1.46 0.146 
 FVL12 β6 -0.287 0.053 -5.47 0.000*** 
 FVL3 β7 -0.262 0.036 -7.34 0.000*** 
 Constant β0 74.877 9.407 7.96 0.000*** 
 
n 871  
Adj. R2  0.856  
Regression Model: F-statistic   330.497 0.000*** 
   
   
H1b: F-statistic   
     β3 = β4 0.00 0.969 
     β3 = β5 77.77 0.000*** 
     β4 = β5 32.66 0.000*** 
 






Value Relevance of Fair Values and Firm-Level Governance 
Independent variables  Coef. Robust SE t-value p-value 
 BV β1 0.302 0.048 6.35 0.000*** 
 NI β2 0.175 0.049 3.61 0.000*** 
 FVA1 β3 0.477 0.066 7.22 0.000*** 
 FVA2 β4 0.359 0.057 6.28 0.000*** 
 FVA3 β5 0.219 0.073 2.98 0.003*** 
 FVA1*GOV β6 -0.107 0.022 -4.86 0.000*** 
 FVA2*GOV β7 0.040 0.021 1.91 0.057* 
 FVA3*GOV β8 0.056 0.073 0.77 0.444 
 FVL12 β9 -0.370 0.065 -5.71 0.000*** 
 FVL3 β10 -0.452 0.062 -7.26 0.000*** 
 Constant β0 95.285 12.166 7.83 0.000*** 
      
n    871  
Adj. R2     0.876  
Regression Model: F-statistic   3295.347 0.000*** 
      
      
H2: F-statistic      
     β3 + β6 = 0    44.74 0.000*** 
     β4 + β7 = 0    50.35 0.000*** 
     β5 + β8 = 0    9.98 0.002*** 
      
     β3 + β6 = β4 + β7    2.60 0.107 
     β3 + β6 = β5 + β8    2.56 0.110 
     β4 + β7 = β5 + β8    3.36 0.067* 
      






Value Relevance of Fair Values and Country-Level Governance 
Independent variables  Coef. Robust SE t-value p-value 
 BV β1 0.186 0.030 6.28 0.000*** 
 NI β2 0.145 0.064 2.29 0.023** 
 FVA1 β3 0.279 0.043 6.48 0.000*** 
 FVA2 β4 0.383 0.077 4.96 0.000*** 
 FVA3 β5 0.081 0.211 0.39 0.699 
 FVA1*RULE β6 0.054 0.018 2.97 0.003*** 
 FVA2*RULE β7 -0.107 0.041 -2.60 0.010** 
 FVA3*RULE β8 0.097 0.245 0.39 0.693 
 FVL12 β9 -0.299 0.058 -5.12 0.000*** 
 FVL3 β10 -0.274 0.026 -10.37 0.000*** 
 Constant β0 78.751 9.498 8.29 0.000*** 
      
n    871  
Adj. R2     0.868  
Regression Model: F-statistic 1804.977 0.000*** 
      
      
H3: F-statistic      
     β3 + β6 = 0    68.99 0.000*** 
     β4 + β7 = 0    31.27 0.000*** 
     β5 + β8 = 0    13.13 0.000*** 
      
     β3 + β6 = β4 + β7    10.46 0.001*** 
     β3 + β6 = β5 + β8    45.45 0.000*** 
     β4 + β7 = β5 + β8    13.60 0.000*** 
      






Value Relevance of Fair Values and Firm- and Country-Level Governance 
Independent variables  Coef. Robust SE t-value p-value 
 BV β1 0.310 0.051 6.13 0.000*** 
 NI β2 0.334 0.139 2.41 0.016** 
 FVA1 β3 0.478 0.097 4.94 0.000*** 
 FVA2 β4 0.555 0.074 7.48 0.000*** 
 FVA3 β5 -0.393 0.210 -1.87 0.062* 
 FVA1*GOV β6 -0.077 0.051 -1.52 0.129 
 FVA2*GOV β7 -0.036 0.062 -0.57 0.566 
 FVA3*GOV β8 0.749 0.231 3.23 0.001*** 
 FVA1*RULE β9 0.046 0.057 0.80 0.426 
 FVA2*RULE β10 -0.169 0.025 -6.73 0.000*** 
 FVA3*RULE β11 0.743 0.255 2.91 0.004*** 
 FVA1*GOV*RULE β12 -0.052 0.059 -0.89 0.376 
 FVA2*GOV*RULE β13 0.085 0.064 1.32 0.186 
 FVA3*GOV*RULE β14 -0.699 0.259 -2.69 0.007*** 
 FVL12 β15 -0.435 0.080 -5.43 0.000*** 
 FVL3 β16 -0.481 0.051 -9.39 0.000*** 
 Constant β0 106.169 13.634 7.79 0.000*** 
      
n    871  
Adj. R2    0.891  
Regression Model: F-statistic 1735.677 0.000*** 
      
      
H4: F-statistic      
     β3 + β6 + β9 + β12 = 0   55.08 0.000*** 
     β4 + β7 + β10 + β13 = 0   36.76 0.000*** 
     β5 + β8 + β11 + β14 = 0   9.96 0.002*** 
      
     β3 + β6 + β9 + β12 = β4 + β7 + β10 + β13  1.64 0.201 
     β3 + β6 + β9 + β12 = β5 + β8 + β11 + β14  0.00 0.960 
     β4 + β7 + β10 + β13 = β5 + β8 + β11 + β14  0.15 0.697 
      






Test of Governance Substitution Effect 
Independent variables  Coef. Robust SE t-value p-value 
 FVA3 β5 -0.393 0.210 -1.87 0.062* 
 FVA3*GOV β8 0.749 0.231 3.23 0.001*** 
 FVA3*RULE β11 0.743 0.255 2.91 0.004*** 
 FVA3*GOV*RULE β14 -0.699 0.259 -2.69 0.007*** 
      
      
H4b: F-statistic      
     β8 + β14 = 0 ∑ = 0.050  0.28 0.595 
     β11 + β14 = 0 ∑ = 0.044  0.01 0.915 
      
      
 Strong country governance Weak country governance  
Strong firm governance β5 + β8 + β11 + β14 β5 + β8  
Weak firm governance β5 + β11 β5  
      





Table 9   
Panel A: Sample Selection   
Listed financial institutions in Canada and Europe from SNL Financial/S&P 
Capital IQ Fundamentals database 
3,241 
Less: Missing data to calculate discretionary loan loss provision 989 
Sample to calculate discretionary loan loss provision  2,252 
Less: Additional missing data to calculate discretionary realized securities 
gains and losses 
71 
Sample to calculate discretionary realized securities gains and losses 2,181 
Less: Missing fair value hierarchy information 327 
Less: Missing firm-level corporate governance information 987 
Final Sample 867 
  
Panel B: Distribution of Sample by Country  
Country Name Freq. % Country Name Freq.    % Country Name Freq.    % 
Austria 14 1.61 Germany 24 2.77 Portugal 17 1.96 
Belgium 21 2.42 Greece 28 3.23 Romania 14 1.61 
Canada 80 9.23 Hungary 13 1.50 Russia 35 4.04 
Croatia 14 1.61 Ireland 14 1.61 Slovakia 14 1.61 
Cyprus 4 0.46 Italy 88 10.15 Spain 47 5.42 
Czech Republic 9 1.04 Kazakhstan 14 1.61 Sweden 28 3.23 
Denmark 21 2.42 Malta 7 0.81 Switzerland 34 3.92 
Finland 7 0.81 Netherlands 14 1.61 Turkey 77 8.88 
France 35 4.04 Norway 17 1.96 Ukraine 11 1.27 
Georgia 2 0.23 Poland 76 8.77 United Kingdom 88 10.15 
          
Panel C: Distribution of Sample by Year   
Year Freq. % 
2011 114 13.15 
2012 118 13.61 
2013 119 13.73 
2014 124 14.30 
2015 129 14.88 
2016 134 15.46 






Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Governance Variables 
   N Mean St.Dev min max p25 Median p75 
Firm-level         
  INDEPENDENCE 867 0.534 0.269 0 1 0.333 0.538 0.750 
  AUDIT 867 0.983 0.130 0 1 1 1 1 
  AC_SIZE 867 4.059 1.830 0 14 3 4 5 
  AC_INDEPENDENCE 867 0.763 0.318 0 1 0.600 1 1 
  INST_OWN 867 0.933 0.250 0 1 1 1 1 
         
Country-level         
  Rule of Law 867 0.994 0.828 -0.819 2.1 0.363 1.059 1.779 
 
Panel B: Governance Factor Score 
Variable  Factor Loading 
Coefficients 
 INDEPENDENCE     0.775 
 AUDIT     0.579 
 AC_SIZE     0.581 
 AC_INDEPENDENCE     0.800 
 INST_OWN     0.178 
  
Variation Explained 38.92% 
Eigenvalue 1.946 
  
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity  
     Chi-Square 608.929 
     Degrees of Freedom 10 
     p-value 0.000 
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics of the Firm-Level Governance Factor Score 
   N Mean St.Dev min max p25 Median p75 






Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for DLLP and DRSGL calculations 
     N   Mean   St.Dev   min   max   p25   Median   p75 
 LLP 2252 0.014 0.037 -0.535 0.522 0.001 0.006 0.015 
 TAmillions 2252 115000 312000 6.967 1730000 1642.282 10250.36 40285.33 
 LnTA 2252 22.984 2.363 15.757 28.182 21.219 23.051 24.419 
 ΔNPL 2252 -0.004 0.087 -1.926 0.966 -0.008 0 0.006 
 LLR 2252 0.057 0.096 0.000 1.616 0.011 0.033 0.069 
 LoanRM 2252 0.178 0.282 0.000 2.081 0.000 0 0.304 
 LoanCon 2252 0.224 0.309 0.000 2.541 0.000 0.077 0.339 
 LoanCom 2252 0.279 0.302 0.000 1.941 0.000 0.188 0.489 
 LoanOth 2252 0.289 0.423 0.000 7.234 0.000 0.046 0.536 
 RSGL 2181 0.001 0.004 -0.013 0.108 0.000 0 0.001 
 UNGL 2181 0.001 0.003 -0.029 0.024 0.000 0 0.001 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis Tests 
     N   Mean   St.Dev   min   max   p25   Median   p75 
 FVA2 867 0.093 0.112 0 0.638 0.014 0.053 0.117 
 FVA3 867 0.009 0.019 0 0.23 0.001 0.003 0.01 
 DLLP 867 0.001 0.022 -0.086 0.432 -0.007 0.001 0.007 
 DRSGL 867 0 0.002 -0.01 0.011 -0.001 0 0 
 ROA 867 0.6 1.898 -32.128 9.93 0.192 0.616 1.156 
 PreROA 867 0.601 1.892 -31.91 9.91 0.199 0.611 1.159 
         
Panel C: Correlation Coefficients 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  (1) DLLP 1.000        
  (2) FVA2 0.057 1.000       
  (3) FVA3 -0.015 0.029 1.000      
  (4) High_PME -0.030 -0.206* -0.100* 1.000     
  (5) Low_PME 0.140* -0.046 0.039 -0.247* 1.000    
  (6) LnTA 0.035 0.556* -0.010 -0.357* 0.084* 1.000   
  (7) ROA -0.290* -0.046 -0.134* 0.453* -0.486* -0.160* 1.000  
  (8) PreROA -0.279* -0.046 -0.134* 0.454* -0.486* -0.160* 1.000* 1.000 






Regression Results Estimating Discretionary Accounting 
      (1)   (2) 
       LLP    RSGL 
LnTA -0.002*** -0.000*** 
   (0.001) (0.000) 
ΔNPL 0.046***  
   (0.017)  
LLR 0.130***  
  (0.027)  
LoanRM -0.012***  
   (0.004)  
LoanCon 0.011**  
   (0.005)  
LoanCom -0.007*  
   (0.004)  
LoanOth -0.005  
   (0.006)  
UNGL  0.140* 
    (0.079) 
Constant 0.047*** 0.003*** 
   (0.012) (0.001) 
 Obs.  2252  2181 
 R2  0.260 0.133 
 F 16.689 6.510 
 Adj. R2 0.241 0.111 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis  







    (1) (2) (3) 
    DLLP DLLP DLLP 
FVA2 0.003 0.010 0.003 
   (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) 
FVA3 0.012 0.024 -0.071** 
   (0.085) (0.087) (0.036) 
High_PME  -0.005*  
    (0.003)  
FVA2*High_PME  -0.032  
    (0.025)  
FVA3*High_PME  -0.198  
    (0.208)  
Low_PME   0.007*** 
     (0.002) 
FVA2*Low_PME   -0.024 
     (0.019) 
FVA3*Low_PME   0.669* 
     (0.405) 
LnTA -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.015 0.026 0.016 
   (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) 
Obs. 867 867 867 
R2 0.110 0.116 0.167 
F-statistic 42.584 39.863 38.701 
Adj. R2 0.069 0.072 0.125 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis  






Regression Results – Firm-Level Corporate Governance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 GOV = 1 GOV = 0 GOV = 1 GOV = 0 GOV = 1 GOV = 0 
FVA2 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.042 0.008 0.006 
   (0.007) (0.027) (0.006) (0.053) (0.007) (0.019) 
FVA3 -0.125*** 0.435 -0.094*** 0.437 -0.128*** 0.222** 
   (0.040) (0.269) (0.020) (0.288) (0.042) (0.089) 
High_PME   0.007 -0.011***   
     (0.006) (0.004)   
FVA2*High_PME   -0.067 -0.053   
     (0.116) (0.053)   
FVA3*High_PME   -0.277 -0.122   
     (0.254) (0.283)   
Low_PME     0.002 0.013*** 
       (0.002) (0.004) 
FVA2*Low_PME     -0.016 0.006 
       (0.014) (0.045) 
FVA3*Low_PME     0.328 0.382 
       (0.241) (0.434) 
LnTA -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
   (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Constant 0.033 -0.016 0.007 -0.022 0.034 -0.027 
   (0.044) (0.020) (0.024) (0.023) (0.044) (0.020) 
Obs.  440  427  440  427  440  427 
R2  0.150 0.201 0.168 0.233 0.152 0.291 
F-statistic 37.306 85.026 33.603 70.514 33.462 8.534 
Adj. R2 0.097 0.141 0.109 0.168 0.092 0.231 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis  






Regression Results – Country-Level Corporate Governance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 RULE = 1 RULE = 0 RULE = 1 RULE = 0 RULE = 1 RULE = 0 
FVA2 0.007 0.010 0.007 0.040 0.006 -0.010 
   (0.007) (0.034) (0.007) (0.076) (0.006) (0.011) 
FVA3 -0.108*** 0.653* -0.076*** 0.723* -0.120*** 0.158** 
   (0.034) (0.369) (0.021) (0.423) (0.041) (0.079) 
High_PME   0.010 -0.013**   
     (0.007) (0.005)   
FVA2*High_PME   -0.143 -0.039   
     (0.122) (0.073)   
FVA3*High_PME   -0.312 -0.634   
     (0.291) (0.422)   
Low_PME     0.000 0.025*** 
       (0.003) (0.009) 
FVA2*Low_PME     -0.000 0.160 
       (0.017) (0.126) 
FVA3*Low_PME     0.194* 1.001* 
       (0.114) (0.531) 
LnTA -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
   (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Constant 0.036 -0.007 0.005 0.001 0.037 -0.004 
   (0.045) (0.021) (0.024) (0.028) (0.047) (0.020) 
Obs.  458  409  458  409  458  409 
R2 0.164 0.184 0.201 0.230 0.166 0.362 
F-statistic 41.714 3.141 40.160 3.160 38.135 4.690 
Adj. R2 0.113 0.137 0.147 0.180 0.109 0.320 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis  






Distribution of GOV by Strength of Legal Enforcement 




























Regression Results – Firm- And Country-Level Corporate Governance 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12) 
    G1    R1 G1    R0 G0    R1 G0   R0 G1    R1 G1    R0 G0    R1 G0    R0 G1    R1 G1    R0 G0    R1 G0    R0 
FVA2 0.013 -0.010 -0.011 0.009 0.012 -0.030 -0.009 0.077 0.014 0.023 -0.005 -0.017 
   (0.009) (0.030) (0.012) (0.032) (0.009) (0.030) (0.012) (0.084) (0.009) (0.032) (0.011) (0.014) 
FVA3 -0.134*** 0.110 0.056 0.737* -0.093*** 0.192 0.062 0.785* -0.141*** 0.118 0.137* 0.183** 
   (0.043) (0.080) (0.042) (0.397) (0.021) (0.128) (0.042) (0.453) (0.047) (0.093) (0.071) (0.082) 
High_PME     0.015 0.004 -0.008 -0.014***     
       (0.013) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005)     
FVA2*High_PME     -0.092 0.100*** -0.070*** -0.087     
       (0.199) (0.036) (0.025) (0.084)     
FVA3*High_PME     -0.433 -0.169 -0.943 -0.434     
      (0.448) (0.192) (1.088) (0.448)     
Low_PME         -0.000 0.001 0.010*** 0.036*** 
           (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.010) 
FVA2*Low_PME         -0.007 -0.066* -0.036** 0.263** 
           (0.020) (0.036) (0.017) (0.120) 
FVA3*Low_PME         0.503 -0.255 -0.195* 0.997* 
           (0.318) (0.275) (0.108) (0.555) 
LnTA -0.002 0.003*** 0.005*** -0.000 -0.000 0.003** 0.006*** -0.000 -0.002 0.002*** 0.006*** -0.000 
   (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.054 -0.065*** -0.145*** 0.014 0.017 -0.062** -0.161*** 0.016 0.058 -0.050*** -0.162*** 0.001 
   (0.053) (0.018) (0.035) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.037) (0.028) (0.055) (0.018) (0.038) (0.019) 
Obs. 345 95 113 314 345 95 113 314 345 95 113 314 
R2 0.148 0.578 0.674 0.227 0.186 0.611 0.680 0.268 0.150 0.628 0.736 0.419 
F-statistic 33.664 16.475 92.526 3.042 30.207 25.674 99.173 2.825 28.709 17.866 40.423 4.690 
Adj. R2 0.089 0.510 0.607 0.172 0.122 0.531 0.602 0.207 0.084 0.552 0.672 0.371 
Country fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis  





Scotiabank Annual Report 2013 






Scotiabank Annual Report 2014 
Instruments not carried at fair value on the balance sheet (i.e. carried at amortized cost) are now 
disclosed at their fair value. In this example, the reported value in S&P Capital IQ Fundamentals 






ASA banka dd Sarajevo 2016 Annual Report 
Table listing the fair value hierarchy for assets and liabilities measured at fair value on a 
recurring basis. The fair value data in this table is neither clear nor intuitively presented and was 
not included in the database. However, the information on the following page, relating to the fair 




ASA banka dd Sarajevo 2016 Annual Report 





Sparkasse Bank dd bih 2017 Annual Report – in Bosnian 
The report in the original language contains the information for the fair value hierarchy, where 
Nivo 1 translates to Level 1. Due to the language, the English translation on the following page 





Sparkasse Bank dd bih 2017 Annual Report – in English 
A truncated view (to permit readability) of the English translation shows that the area that would 
contain “Level 1”, contains the phrase “Levels of” and is missing the numerical value. This 





Sparkasse Bank dd bih – 2016 Annual Report 
This official English translation includes this table, which lists the fair value hierarchy for assets 
and liabilities carried at fair value on a recurring basis. Despite this, the information was listed as 
0 in the database. Discussions with the database provider indicated that this information, due to 
its presentation was missed. The information on the following page was viewed, but 




Sparkasse Bank dd bih – 2016 Annual Report 
Presentation of fair value hierarchy by level (nivo) for items carried at amortized cost. Properly 







Liberbank SA 2017 Annual Report 
Presentation of fair value hierarchy that does not clearly delineate between assets and liabilities 






Metro Bank PLC 2017 Annual Report 
The financial statement note on investment securities contains the fair value hierarchy of assets 
carried at fair value on a recurring basis. However, note 11 (on the next page) is titled Fair Value 
of Financial Instruments and contains information on the hierarchy. However, this information is 





Metro Bank PLC 2017 Annual Report 
This note visually presents the information as representing assets and liabilities carried at fair 






Wiener Privatbank SE 2016 Annual Report 
This table presents the fair value hierarchy for items carried at fair value on a recurring basis and 
for items carried at amortized cost, but does not clearly delineate between them. 
 
